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QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?
LIMITS ON WIDESPREAD
SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING BY LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFTER 9/11
1

In the decade since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, local law
enforcement has become the front line in the nation’s counterterrorism
strategy. This involvement has not come without controversy. As part of
these counterterrorism efforts, police departments have begun to establish
widespread surveillance and intelligence-gathering networks to monitor
Muslim and other ethnic neighborhoods in the hopes of stopping the next
terrorist attack at its source. Such surveillance does not necessarily run
afoul of the Constitution, and both our political environment—in which
voters demand that the government stop terrorism at all costs—as well as
unprecedented levels of federal funding to fight terrorism have made these
surveillance programs an attractive option for local law enforcement. But
the same programs risk compromising citizens’ civil liberties and
damaging police relationships with ethnic communities. This Comment
analyzes whether and how a balance might be struck between national
security and individual civil liberties interests, and offers a model
statutory solution drawn from police surveillance in a non-terrorismrelated context as one possible way forward.
I.
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A. The Transformation of Local Law Enforcement

1. Literally translated from the Latin, “Who will guard the guards themselves?,” see
GABRIEL G. ADELEYE & KOFI ACQUAH-DADZIE, WORLD DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN
EXPRESSIONS: A RESOURCE FOR READERS AND WRITERS 332 (Thomas J. Sienkewicz &
James T. McDonough eds., 1999), though the phrase is sometimes translated more
figuratively as “Who watches the watchmen?” One of the most famous epigrams, it appears
in Juvenal’s Satire VI. JUVENAL: THE SATIRES 200 (John Ferguson ed., 1979). Juvenal was
a Roman satirist of the first and second centuries; although little is known about his life,
including the dates of his birth, death, and authorship of the satires, most estimates place the
satires between 110 and 120 A.D. CHRISTOPHER KELK, THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL: A
VERSE TRANSLATION ix (2010).
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INTRODUCTION

Late in his majority opinion in the 1983 Supreme Court case of
United States v. Knotts, in which police placed a criminal suspect under
2
continuous surveillance to discover the location of his secret lair, thenAssociate Justice William Rehnquist addressed the defendant’s
argument that allowing police to conduct such surveillance without a
warrant was a slippery slope that would ultimately lead to “twenty-four
hour surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial
3
knowledge or supervision.” As members of the Court are wont to do
when dealing with hypothetical fact patterns, Justice Rehnquist punted,
writing that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
4
applicable.” In hindsight, Justice Rehnquist’s response can hardly be
called regrettable; at the time, long-term surveillance was typically
subject to multiple levels of review and only implemented if the benefits
5
outweighed the costs. And so it was that the Court upheld the use of
the tracking device, Knotts lost his appeal, and Justice Rehnquist’s
promise was consigned to the dusty pages of volume 460 of the United
States Reports.
Perhaps, that is, until now. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, a series of unexpected events has made systematic, widespread,
twenty-four-hour surveillance of not just individuals but entire
6
neighborhoods and cities a reality. This series of events began with the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which prompted a seismic shift
2. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276-80 (1983). Knotts, which involved the use
of a primitive GPS tracking device, is discussed in more detail infra in Part III.C.1; see also
infra note 145 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in another case involving GPS
tracking devices, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), and its potential impact on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). But note that the defendant’s argument—and the scope
of this Comment—both focus on broader surveillance practices, of which GPS tracking
devices are only a subset.
3. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 9, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (no.
81-1802)).
4. Id.
5. For example, in the 1980s, the FBI’s Undercover Operations Review Committee
reviewed undercover operations and classified them as either Group I or Group II
investigations; those classified as Group I—because they were expected to cost more than
$20,000, last longer than six months, or involve “sensitive circumstances”—were subject to
multiple layers of approval and a multi-factor cost–benefit analysis. GARY T. MARX,
UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 183 (1988).
6. See infra Part II.B for some of the most high-profile examples from recent years.
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in our nation’s security priorities that has penetrated to the lowest levels
of local government. As part of this shift, the federal government has
poured unprecedented levels of funding into local police departments,
removing many of the economic barriers to extended, widespread police
7
surveillance and intelligence gathering that previously existed. As a
result, police surveillance is now testing the boundaries of constitutional
jurisprudence in ways that—as Justice Rehnquist may have assumed in
1983—would never have seemed likely, or even possible.
This Comment undertakes the analysis that might occur if, thirty
years later, we were to field Justice Rehnquist’s punt in Knotts and
assess whether constitutional principles may be applicable to such
surveillance—and if not, what the next-best solution for protecting
individuals’ civil liberties might be. It begins in Part II with an overview
of the events during the last decade that have led us to this point,
describing the shift in national priorities that followed September 11,
2001, and detailing two of the more infamous cases of widespread police
surveillance and intelligence gathering that have surfaced in recent
8
years. Part III assesses whether constitutional principles are applicable
to this new surveillance, namely, the Fourth Amendment’s protections
of individuals’ privacy through its prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures. In an effort to illuminate the present state of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Part III also dives into the Amendment’s
historical roots and discusses three key exceptions to its general rule.
Finding the Fourth Amendment’s protections inadequate, Part IV
discusses the next-best alternative, statutory protections, and the
competing interests—national security and individuals’ privacy—that
must be taken into account when drafting potential legislation. Finally,
Part V returns to the present, drawing upon a recent instance of police
surveillance and intelligence gathering conducted on anti-death penalty
activists in Maryland to develop a model statutory solution that strikes a
balance between protecting citizens’ civil liberties and affording police
the latitude to conduct investigation when the need arises. Part V goes

7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Because this Comment is primarily concerned with widespread police surveillance
and intelligence gathering conducted by local law enforcement agencies, it does not discuss
past federal programs such as the U.S. Defense Department’s Counterintelligence Field
Activity database or the TALON reporting mechanism. For a discussion of these topics, see
Lisa Myers et al., Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans?, NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2005, 6:18
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10454316/ns/nbcnightlynews-nbc_news_investigates/t/pe
ntagon-spying-americans/.
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on to analyze how such a model statute might have helped to mitigate
some of the police conduct detailed in Part II. Part VI concludes.
II. COUNTERTERRORISM AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
In the decade following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in
New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, the United States
understandably redirected a significant portion of its national resources
9
toward counterterrorism and homeland security. But while a shift in
national priorities was inevitable—given that homeland security has a
primarily national scope—an equivalent shift in state and local law
enforcement priorities may not have been as predictable. As this Part
will show, however, that shift has occurred. Local law enforcement
agencies are now widely involved in counterterrorism activities in a
variety of capacities, including (and in some cases, especially)
surveillance and intelligence gathering.
With this increased
involvement, however, has come an unfortunate side effect:
counterterrorism surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations
implemented by local law enforcement agencies have brushed against
constitutional protections of individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. This
Part will first provide a summary of the changes that have occurred with
respect to local law enforcement and counterterrorism priorities over
the last decade, and then review some of the more recent examples of
police activity that have aroused concerns over civil liberties.
A. The Transformation of Local Law Enforcement Following
September 11, 2001
As some have noted, “the most striking feature” of law enforcement
10
in the United States is its decentralization. There are about 600,000 to
9. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established on Nov. 25, 2002, by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). The Act brought twenty-two different federal agencies
under DHS’s authority. Donald F. Kettl, Overview, in THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME LAND
SECURITY’S FIRST YEAR: A REPORT CARD 1, 1 (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2004). In the year
following the creation of DHS, the number of federal government employees focused on
homeland security doubled; today, DHS has 183,000 employees, making it the third-largest
Cabinet-level department, after the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans
Affairs. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 1940, FED.
EMP. STAT. (Sept. 30), http://www.opm.gov/feddata/HistoricalTables/ExecutiveBranchSince1
940.asp.
10. David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635,
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700,000 local police officers in the United States, spread out among
somewhere from 13,000 to 19,000 local law enforcement agencies across
12
the country. Despite the fact that local law enforcement accounts for
13
the majority of crime fighting in the United States, its experience with
counterterrorism and national security prior to September 11, 2001, was
minimal.
Instead, over the years, local law enforcement has been drawn into
the national security arena only occasionally—for example, after World
14
15
War I, both before and after World War II, and again during the
16
17
1980s and early 1990s —and never for any consistent purpose. The
result was that, by the mid-1990s, many states had enacted statutes
18
criminalizing terrorist activities, yet less than half of all local law
enforcement agencies had developed contingency plans for terrorist

635 (2005).
11. See id. (estimating more than 600,000 local law enforcement officers in the United
States); David E. Kaplan, Spies Among Us, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 8, 2006, at 40, 43
(estimating over 700,000 officers).
12. See Thacher, supra note 10, at 635 (counting nearly 13,000 local law enforcement
agencies in the United States); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American
Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y
377, 380 (2009) (finding sources that cite up to 19,000 agencies).
13. Waxman, supra note 12, at 380.
14. In 1919 and 1920, local police assisted the Bureau of Investigation (the predecessor
to the modern-day Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI) in the Palmer Raids, a series of
mass arrests of suspected left-wing radicals. Id. at 379.
15. In 1939, with World War II looming, President Franklin Roosevelt urged “all police
officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States” to turn over any
evidence regarding acts of “espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and
violations of the neutrality law” to the FBI. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown
(Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1715 (2010) (quoting 1 NAT’L
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE READER: AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR II 177 (Frank J. Rafalko ed., 2004)). In the 1950s and 1960s,
the FBI enlisted local law enforcement in its Counter-Intelligence Program, which was
designed to gather information about “allegedly subversive political groups.” Waxman, supra
note 12, at 379.
16. In 1980, the FBI’s New York City field office established the first Joint Terrorism
Task Force in response to a series of domestic terrorism incidents. NAT’L COMM’N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 81
(2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
17. The FBI’s New York City Joint Terrorism Task Force allowed local law enforcement
in New York City, as well as other federal agencies, to share information with the FBI and to
become involved in the FBI’s investigations—both throughout the 1980s and again after the
first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Id.
18. Waxman, supra note 12, at 381.
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19

attacks, and only about 60% of cities had been in contact with the
20
federal government regarding terrorism-related issues.
Simply put,
prior to September 11, 2001, “with the exception of one portion of the
FBI, very little of the sprawling U.S. law enforcement community was
21
engaged in countering terrorism.”
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this began to
change. On November 13, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
ordered all United States Attorneys to work with local law enforcement
22
on counterterrorism measures. In 2006, President George W. Bush
23
reiterated the importance of local law enforcement to national security.
Across the political spectrum, there was no shortage of agreement in
Washington that local law enforcement represented the country’s “front
24
line of defense against terrorism” because, as one report put it, “[a]ll
25
terrorism is local.”
For its part, Congress provided the financial backing to bring local
law enforcement into the war on terror. The Homeland Security Act of
26
2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security, also
27
established an Office for State and Local Government Coordination;
one of the primary responsibilities of this office is to “assess, and

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 82.
22. Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all United States Attorneys in which he wrote
that successfully countering the emerging threat of terrorism meant “law enforcement
officials at all levels of government—federal, state, and local—must work together, sharing
information and resources needed to both arrest and prosecute the individuals responsible
and to detect and destroy terrorist cells before they can strike again.” Memorandum from
John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys (Nov. 13,
2001), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=452215. Ashcroft’s directive gave the
nation’s ninety-three United States Attorney offices less than three weeks to establish a
protocol for terrorism-related information sharing with state and local law enforcement
officials, and required that the protocol provide for the possibility of communication “24
hours a day, 7 days a week.” Id.
23. See President George W. Bush, The White House, Address to the Nation
on Immigration Reform (May 15, 2006) (transcript available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-8.html).
24. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 42.
25. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, FROM HOMETOWN SECURITY TO HOMELAND
SECURITY: IACP’S PRINCIPLES FOR A LOCALLY DESIGNED AND NATIONALLY
COORDINATED HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 3 (2005).
26. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
27. 6 U.S.C. § 361(a) (2006).
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advocate for, the resources needed by State and local government to
28
implement the national strategy for combating terrorism.” Since the
Act’s passage, the Department of Homeland Security has allocated
more than $35 billion in federal funding to state and local governments
to “strengthen[] [the] nation’s ability to prevent, protect, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate terrorist attacks, major disasters and other
29
emergencies.” The largest two components of annual appropriation—
together representing more than half of the entire block of annual
funding—are the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban
Areas Security Initiative, both of which are primarily aimed at funding
30
local law enforcement agencies.
Furthermore, since the passage of the Implementing
31
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, states must
ensure that at least 25% of funding received through either the State
Homeland Security Program or the Urban Areas Security Initiative is
32
used for “law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.”
State and local law enforcement agencies have readily taken
advantage of this funding, directing federal counterterrorism dollars into
at least four different categories of terrorism-related activities at the
local level, many of which would have been unheard-of—or at least

28. Id. § 361(b)(2).
29. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces More Than $2.1
Billion in Preparedness Grants (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/08/
23/dhs-announces-more-21-billion-preparedness-grants (describing the allocation of
“approximately $35 billion” in grants for the period 2002–2011); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., DHS Announces More Than $1.3 Billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012
Preparedness Grant Awards (June 29, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/29/
dhs-announces-more-13-billion-fiscal-year-fy-2012-preparedness-grant-awards
[hereinafter
FY 2012 DHS Grants].
30. For example, in the fiscal year 2012 appropriation (announced in June 2012) State
Homeland Security Program (SHSP) grants totaled $294 million and Urban Areas Security
Imitative (UASI) grants totaled $490 million. FY 2012 DHS Grants, supra note 29. Put
together, this equals $784 million, or 60%, of the $1.3 billion in total preparedness grants
issued by DHS that year. See id. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) funding
“supports the implementation of state Homeland Security Strategies.” FY 2012 Homeland
Security Grant Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last updated July 12, 2012, 2:27
PM), http://www.fema.gov/fy-2012-homeland-security-grant-program.
The Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) provides funding to “address the unique . . . needs of high-threat,
high-density urban areas, and assists them in building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to
prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.” Id.
31. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
32. 6 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1).
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33

impractical—in a pre-September 11 world.
First, many local law
enforcement agencies reassigned personnel to newly created or
34
expanded counterterrorism departments.
Second, law enforcement
began upgrading its technology and weaponry; recent counterterrorism
35
acquisitions by local police include surveillance cameras, SUVs that
36
37
can detect nuclear radiation, military-grade assault rifles, and even an
38
unmanned aerial vehicle. Third, local law enforcement agencies have

33. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text (noting that the Homeland Security
Act, which provided state and local law enforcement agencies with a substantial amount of
federal funding, was passed in 2002, post-9/11).
34. See, e.g., Chuck Bennett, Shepherding Safe Subways, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov.
28, 2006, at A6 (describing how the New York Police Department has deployed canine units
“devoted exclusively to the subway,” the first such units since the 1980s, whose “overall
mission is counterterrorism and to fight crime”); Chicago Tribune, Police Expanding Role in
Fighting Terror, REDEYE, Nov. 12, 2010, at 8 (reporting that the Chicago Police Department
had widened its mission to include counterterrorism, hired a longtime FBI agent to create a
counterterrorism and intelligence division within the department, and permanently assigned
an officer to Washington, D.C., to liaise with federal agencies on counterterrorism); Jennifer
Maloney, Newest Dogged Pursuit, NEWSDAY (New York), June 14, 2007, at A22 (reporting
on the New York State Metropolitan Transit Authority’s deployment of canine teams as part
of counterterrorism efforts on the Long Island Rail Road, the nation’s busiest commuter rail
system); Terrorism Preparedness Statement, U. ARK. UNIV. POLICE, http://uapd.uark.edu/99.
php (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (describing terrorism preparations made by university police
at the University of Arkansas, including the assignment of a full-time officer to the regional
Joint Terrorism Task Force).
35. E.g., Bradley Olson & Zain Shauk, Smile, If You’re Downtown, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 25, 2010, at A1 (describing a network of 250 to 300 surveillance cameras in downtown
Houston); Vic Ryckaert, Cameras Help Fight Crime, Police Say, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec.
31, 2007, at B1 (reporting on a 67-camera surveillance network in Indianapolis, as well as
similar networks in Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, and Chicago).
36. The New Jersey State Police, the New York Police Department, and the United
States Secret Service each own SUVs, known as RadTrucks, that are outfitted with $200,000
worth of radiation detection equipment and used to patrol public highways for potential
terrorist nuclear threats. See Sam Wood, New SUVs Are Like Police Radar for Terrorism,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 9, 2007, at B10.
37. In Massachusetts, more than eighty cities and towns across the state have given their
police officers access to military-grade assault rifles and other weaponry “in response to the
fear of terrorist attacks.” Donovan Slack, Police Add Assault Rifles Across the State, BOS.
GLOBE, June 3, 2009, at A1. Notably, in Boston, the largest city in Massachusetts, Mayor
Thomas Menino refused to issue any of the city’s 200 assault rifles to neighborhood patrol
officers after community leaders described the use of assault weapons as the “‘militarization’
of local police.” Id. at A12.
38. In 2011, the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, whose jurisdiction is north of
Houston in Texas, used federal homeland security grant money to purchase an unmanned
aerial vehicle for surveillance purposes. Robert Stanton, Drones Prompt Privacy Fears,
HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2011, at B2; Stephen Dean, New Police Drone Near Houston Could
Carry Weapons, CLICK2HOUSTON.COM, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.click2houston.com/news/2
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spent considerable time training officers how to respond to terrorist
threats through classroom instruction, exercises, and, in some cases,
39
public drills.
Finally—now more involved, better funded, better
trained, and better equipped with the latest technology and weaponry
40
than at any point during the last ten years —local law enforcement
41
agencies have sprung into action, providing heightened security and
42
Many of these
heightened responses to potential terrorist threats.
9619788/detail.html.
39. See, e.g., Christine Byers, Training Ground: Terrorist Attacks Lead to New Training
for St. Louis County Police, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 28, 2011, at B1 (reporting on
St. Louis County, Missouri, which in 2011 became the first county in the nation to require
officers department-wide to undergo counterterrorism training); Tom Feeney, Police Practice
Derailing Terror Threats, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 9, 2006, at 15 (describing a
150-officer rapid-response force designed to be activated in the aftermath of a terrorist attack,
which was paid for with funding received from the Department of Homeland Security
through the Urban Areas Security Initiative); Ann Scott Tyson, Metro Stages a Display of Its
Force, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2010, at B2 (describing a mock “anti-terrorism sweep” conducted
by Washington’s Metro Transit Police during a weekday morning rush hour at the city’s
Union Station, which involved fifty officers armed with M-4 assault rifles and bomb-sniffing
dogs).
40. See supra notes 33–39.
41. Police have become especially sensitive to individuals who act suspiciously near
traditionally high-profile terrorist targets such as stadiums and airports. See, e.g., Del
Quentin Wilber, Police on the Lookout for Terrorists With Missiles Near Airports, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 2006, at A3 (describing how Washington, D.C. area police forces patrol near
airports to scout for terrorists with shoulder-fired rockets who may be looking to shoot down
aircrafts during takeoffs and landings). Indeed, police have become so sensitive that such
heightened responses are typical even when there is no evidence to connect the suspects to
known terrorist groups, or even when the site in question is not directly targeted. See Charlie
Cain & Francis X. Donnelly, Michigan Quickly Enacts Emergency Plans, DETROIT NEWS,
Aug. 11, 2006, at 9A (describing how Michigan authorities, including state police, put
emergency-response plans into action after British police reportedly foiled a plot by terrorists
to explode planes bound for the U.S., despite the lack of evidence that any targets were in
Michigan); Rebecca Lopez, Figure in Airport Watch Case Confirms Terrorist Tie, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 7, 2007, at 9B (reporting on two Muslim women in Dallas who became
the subjects of a police intelligence bulletin after police observed them “acting suspiciously”
at Love Field, though police also said they had no evidence the women were connected to
terrorism, and one of the women had no criminal record).
42. For example, missing, stolen, or otherwise suspicious vehicles, which might have
previously been treated as just that, now draw intense scrutiny from police out of concern for
possible ties to terrorism. See, e.g., Colleen Long, Van Stirs Security Worries in NYC, BOS.
GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2009, at A8 (reporting on the New York Police Department’s closure of
Times Square after discovering a parked van without license plates in advance of New Year’s
Eve celebrations); Allison Steele, Police Find Vans That Sparked Terror Alert, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 2011, at B4 (describing how the theft of four rental trucks in
Philadelphia, shortly before the tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, prompted a
terrorism alert among city police). This is true even despite the occasional false alarm. See,
e.g., John M. Guilfoil, Van’s Fuel Sparks a Terrorism Response, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2011, at
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responses are understandably colored by the terrorist attacks that have
occurred in other countries during the years since the September 11
43
attacks.
But they have also become magnified in larger cities—
especially New York City, where police are quick to increase security
and implement emergency-response plans at major tourist centers when
44
a terrorism alert arises almost anywhere in the world. Clearly, police
are going further than ever before to ensure that terrorists do not strike
again. But in some cases, such as those in the next section, these efforts
come at great expense to the civil liberties of those the police are trying
to protect.
B. Local Law Enforcement’s Expanded Role in Counterterrorism Has
Raised Civil Liberties Concerns in the Past
Although the federal government was eager to enlist local law
enforcement agencies as the “front line of defense” in the fight against
45
terrorism, this involvement has become a double-edged sword in the
decade following September 11, 2001. In a number of incidents that
have occurred during the last ten years, local law enforcement
surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities conducted for
counterterrorism purposes have drawn the attention of civil liberties
advocates who say these activities infringe individuals’ constitutional
rights. This Part presents two of the most notable incidents from recent
years, to provide a flavor of the types of activities with which this
Comment is concerned.

B3 (reporting on a counterterrorism response by police in Tewksbury, Massachusetts, after an
officer spotted two college students “who appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent” loading
compressed natural gas into a van; it turned out the van was designed to run on natural gas as
part of a harmless—albeit unlicensed—experiment with alternative fuels).
43. See, e.g., Tom Hays, Beneath NYC, Police Fight Terror with Stealth, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2010, at 1 (describing how the NYPD has studied terrorist attacks on
transit systems in Madrid, London, Bombay, and Moscow to develop best practices in
defending the New York City Subway); Kevin Johnson & Thomas Frank, Mumbai Attacks
Refocus U.S. Cities, USA TODAY, Dec. 5–7, 2008, at 1A (reporting on new precautions taken
with “soft targets” by U.S. police forces following the November 2008 terrorist attacks in
Mumbai, India).
44. Joie Tyrell, Terror Plot Foiled in Britain, NEWSDAY (New York), June 14, 2007, at
A22 (describing how the NYPD strengthened security in the transit system and in major New
York City tourist areas such as Times Square, Herald Square, and the theater district after
police discovered a car bomb in a busy area of London).
45. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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1. Los Angeles Police Propose Mapping Muslim Communities (2007)
In 2007, the counterterrorism bureau of the Los Angeles Police
46
Department (LAPD) began developing a plan to identify and map
47
48
Muslim enclaves of Los Angeles. The plan’s ostensible purpose was
“to help Muslim communities avoid the influence” of radical and
49
extremist elements. Under the plan, the LAPD would identify Muslim
neighborhoods that were at risk of isolation using data from the U.S.
50
Census Bureau and demographic factors that, the police believed,
made these neighborhoods susceptible to extremism and likely to
51
become breeding grounds for homegrown terrorist cells.
Having
identified these neighborhoods, the LAPD would then add information
from community members about residents, homes, businesses, mosques,
“language, culture, ethnic breakdown, socioeconomic status and [even]

46. As of 2010, the Los Angeles Police Department was the nation’s third-largest loca
law enforcement agency, with 9,858 sworn officers serving a population of
3.8 million residents. Full-time Law Enforcement Employees by State by City, 2010,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2010), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-inthe-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl78.xls/view
(follow
“Download
Excel”
hyperlink) [hereinafter Full-time Law Enforcement].
47. The metropolitan Los Angeles area—which includes Orange and Riverside
Counties—has an estimated 500,000 Muslims, the second-largest Muslim community in the
United States, after New York City’s. Neil MacFarquhar, Protest Greets Police Plan to Map
Muslim Angelenos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at A23.
48. Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2007, at A1[hereinafter Winton, LAPD to Build Data] (quoting Deputy Chief Michael
Downing of the Los Angeles Police Department, who was in charge of the Department’s
counterterrorism bureau at the time). The plan quickly became known in the media as a
“mapping” plan, though Downing disputed this characterization, preferring instead the term
“community engagement” plan. Plan to Map L.A.’s Muslims Sparks Outrage, NPR, 0:22–0:45
(Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16162012 [hereinafter
Plan to Map]. Perhaps ironically, however, the details of the plan first became public because
of Downing’s testimony before a United States Senate committee, in which he himself used
the word “mapping.”
Michael P. Downing, Commanding Officer, CounterTerrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, L.A. Police Dep’t., Statement Before the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate 7
(Oct. 30, 2007) (prepared text available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Michael%20
DowningTestimonyfortheU.S.Senate-Final.PDF).
49. Winton, LAPD to Build Data, supra note 48.
50. Richard Winton et al., Outcry Over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at
A1 [hereinafter Winton, Outrcy]. But see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
51. Winton, Outcry, supra note 50. The same idea gained traction with police in New
York City during 2007 as well, and likewise drew criticism from civil liberties groups. See Al
Baker, City Police Report Explores Homegrown Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at B3
(describing NYPD report that finds, among other things, “unassimilated Muslims in the
United States are vulnerable to extremism”).
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social interactions” within the neighborhoods to paint a full picture of
52
Muslim life in Los Angeles.
To perform this analysis, the LAPD
partnered with the University of Southern California’s National Center
53
for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. Although the
LAPD said the program would not involve spying on citizens—
comparing it instead to market research, and insisting the program
54
would focus on groups, rather than individuals —the LAPD’s
counterterrorism chief, Michael Downing, later testified before
Congress that the program would use a “full-spectrum approach guided
55
by an intelligence-led strategy.”
After the plan’s details became public, the resulting uproar among
56
civil liberties groups and Muslim activists was immediate. Some groups
57
compared the plan to “religious profiling,” and the American Civil
Liberties Union and community leaders expressed “grave concerns”
about the plan’s premise that “Muslims are more likely to commit
58
violent acts than people of other faiths.”
The fallout was equally swift. The Los Angeles Times’ editorial
pages soon featured letters to the editor from non-Muslim readers
59
generally condemning the plan. Muslim groups also protested outside
60
The LAPD’s academic
of the LAPD’s headquarters building.
partnership with USC disintegrated as the university began distancing

52. Winton, LAPD to Build Data, supra note 48 (quoting Los Angeles Deputy Chief
Michael P. Downing, who headed the LAPD’s anti-terrorism bureau).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.; Downing, supra note 48, at 7.
56. Winton, Outcry, supra note 50. But see Winton, LAPD to Build Data, supra note 48
(quoting Salam Al-Marayati, the director of Los Angeles’s Muslim Public Affairs Council, as
saying Michael Downing, the LAPD’s counterterrorism chief, is “well-known in the Muslim
community” and has “been very forthright in his engagement with the Muslim community”).
57. Winton, Outcry, supra note 50. But see Plan to Map, supra note 48, at 2:20–2:57
(interviewing the LAPD’s counterterrorism chief, Michael Downing, who said that the police
used criteria other than religious or racial characteristics in identifying Muslim enclaves at
risk of extremism, though he did not identify the specific criteria that might be used).
58. Letter from Ranjana Natarajan, Staff Att’y, ACLU of S. Cal., et al., to Michael P.
Downing, Commander, Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, L.A. Police Dep’t
(Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/Muslim_Leaders_to_LAPD.pdf.
59. See Margaret Manning et al., Letters to the Editor, Is the LAPD Off the Map?, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at A18 (featuring four letters to the editor regarding the mapping plan,
with three condemning the plan and one in favor).
60. Daniel B. Wood & Alison Tully, Why L.A. Police Nixed Plan to Map Muslims,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 2007, at 2.
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61

itself from the project. Experts, industry veterans, and Los Angeles
residents alike expressed skepticism that the plan was even feasible, for
at least four reasons: the Census Bureau may not compel Americans to
62
disclose their religious affiliations; Los Angeles neighborhoods are far
63
from demographically homogenous; surveys indicate American
Muslims are more integrated and more dispersed than their European
64
counterparts; and decades of controversy over similar monitoring
efforts by the FBI had convinced federal officials that it was best to
65
avoid any initiatives with even the barest racial elements. The LAPD
initially stood behind the plan, but public criticism continued to mount,
and less than a week after details of the plan became public, the LAPD
66
announced it was cancelling the initiative.
It is important to note that the LAPD canceled the initiative not
because police concluded gathering intelligence on Muslim community
67
members had no value, but rather because of “widespread criticism by
68
both Muslim and other religious leaders.”
And though most
community groups appeared satisfied by the LAPD’s response to their
69
protests, civil liberties advocates remained suspicious, saying they
61. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A1, A21 (reporting that “after details of the effort were made public
last week, USC officials said they were carefully studying whether to join the endeavor and
stressed that no deal had been made”).
62. See 13 U.S.C. § 221(c) (2006) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no
person shall be compelled to disclose information relative to his religious beliefs or to
membership in a religious body.”). This statute has been in place since 1976. Act of Oct. 17,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, § 13, 90 Stat. 2465.
63. See Winton, Outcry, supra note 50.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Greg Krikorian & Teresa Watanabe, Experts See Value in Data on Muslims, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at B1, B10.
67. On the contrary, veteran counterterrorism experts and academics said that the data
would have been valuable both in the abstract and that there was precedent to indicate the
data would have value in a pragmatic sense. Id. As one retired counterterrorism official put
it, “In the old days, when you looked for La Cosa Nostra, you didn’t start looking in Polish
neighborhoods.” Id.
68. Wood & Tully, supra note 60.
69. Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton met for two hours with Muslim
community leaders to hear their concerns before giving a public speech in which he declared
the mapping project was “DOA—dead on arrival.” Krikorian & Watanabe, supra note 66. It
is worth noting that, throughout the period of public outcry over the plan, both Chief Bratton
and Deputy Chief Downing were generally well regarded by the city’s Muslim community for
their willingness to hear the community’s concerns and their generally progressive views on
community policing. See MacFarquhar, supra note 47 (“Among those [members of the
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would continue to monitor the LAPD’s activities in this area going
70
forward.
The civil liberties advocates may have had good reason to remain
suspicious. The epilogue to the mapping initiative is that, in 2008, the
LAPD launched a new program in which it modified the investigativereport form that all officers must complete in response to a crime,
adding a section to the form for officers to describe activities they have
71
witnessed that may be related to terrorism. If an officer reports such
information, the report is forwarded to the LAPD’s counterterrorism
bureau, where it is entered into the LAPD’s database for further
analysis—both by the LAPD itself and other law enforcement
72
agencies.
But the LAPD’s officers are required to report such
activities even if the activities are not connected to criminal activity and
73
even if the officer lacks any independent suspicion of wrongdoing.
Furthermore, the ACLU noted many of the activities considered
74
“suspicious” by the LAPD were innocuous and commonplace. Despite
these concerns, the LAPD’s suspicious-activity reporting model has not
75
only become cemented within the department, but has also been
adopted in at least a dozen other cities—where, so far, the only results
Muslim community] interviewed, whatever their position on the project, Mr. Downing rated
high marks for his community policing efforts . . . .”); Wood & Tully, supra note 60 (quoting a
police accountability advocate as describing Bratton as “one of America’s finest” police
chiefs).
70. Wood & Tully, supra note 60 (quoting an ACLU attorney who mentions the
LAPD’s “long history . . . of profiling” and that the group will “make sure that it[—]this
profiling[—]comes to an end”).
71. Josh Meyer, LAPD Leads the Way in Local Counter-Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2008, at B4.
72. Id.
73. Special Order, William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t., No. 11
on Reporting Incidents Potentially Related to Foreign or Domestic Terrorism (Mar. 5,
2008), reprinted in FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
REPORT (SAR): SUPPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, 36–42 (2008), available at
www.it.ojp.gov/documents/SAR_Report_October_2008.pdf.
74. MIKE GERMAN & JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FUSION CENTER
UPDATE
1–2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf. Examples included “taking
measurements,” “using binoculars,” and “taking pictures or video footage ‘with no apparent
esthetic value.’” Id. at 2. The report also cited several examples in which local law
enforcement agencies across the country had temporarily detained or interrogated individuals
for engaging in activities similar to these. Id. at 6–7.
75. Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton has described the program as the “‘heart
and soul’ of the LAPD’s counterterrorism efforts.” Siobhan Gorman, LAPD Terror-Tip Plan
May Serve as Model, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2008, at A3.
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from these reports have been non-terrorism-related arrests.
In many ways, the new program closely resembles (and achieves
many of the same objectives as) the abandoned plan to map Muslim
neighborhoods—it involves a comprehensive effort to gather and
analyze data about everyday activities—but without a sensitive racial or
religious component.
In fact, such intelligence gathering and
surveillance remains one of the most common ways in which local law
enforcement agencies have begun to encroach upon civil liberties in the
77
name of counterterrorism in the years following September 11, 2001.
2. New York City Police Infiltrate Muslim Neighborhoods (2001–
present)
Not long after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the New
78
York Police Department (NYPD) established a secret intelligence unit
designed to gather information on Muslim and other ethnic
neighborhoods in New York City as the first step toward preventing
79
80
future terrorist attacks on the city. The unit, which still operates as of

76. See Eric Schmitt, Surveillance Effort Draws Civil Liberties Concern, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2009, at A12 (reporting that the LAPD program has also been implemented in
Boston, Chicago, Houston, Las Vegas, Miami, Phoenix, Seattle, and Washington, D.C., as
well as in Florida, Virginia, and New York State, with hopes for a national network to be in
place by 2014; none of the city officials interviewed for the article could name any examples
of potential terrorist attacks that had been stopped as a result of the program).
77. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40901, TERRORISM
INFORMATION SHARING AND THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT
INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2011) (noting that “[a]lthough
data mining for counterterrorism purposes predated the 9/11 attacks, it was considered a
particularly promising tool after it was learned that certain database searches would have
disclosed connections between . . . two 9/11 hijackers who were on a government terrorist
watch list prior to September 11” (footnote omitted)).
78. In 2010, the New York Police Department was the nation’s single largest city law
enforcement agency, with 34,817 sworn officers serving a population of 8.3 million. Full-time
Law Enforcement, supra note 46.
79. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Spies in Jersey, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Aug. 25, 2011, at 1 [hereinafter Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies].
80. In its current form, the NYPD’s intelligence unit is the brainchild of David Cohen, a
retired CIA official who was hired specifically to turn the unit into a localized version of the
CIA. Id. at 5. Prior to Cohen’s tenure, the NYPD’s intelligence unit was apparently best
known for driving foreign diplomats around New York City. Id. City officials instead wanted
a unit that would “analyze intelligence, run undercover operations and cultivate a network of
informants.” Id. Cohen was just the man for the job—he brought aboard former colleagues
from his days at the CIA to train NYPD officers in the art of intelligence gathering. Id.
Cohen also convinced a federal judge to allow police officers to open investigative files
without any suspicion of criminal activity, lifting “major elements” of restrictions that had
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81

2012, infiltrates these neighborhoods using undercover officers and
informants as well as information-gathering and mapping techniques
82
similar to those proposed for the earlier LAPD plan.
As part of the NYPD intelligence unit’s activities, undercover
83
84
officers from the unit monitor ethnic communities, either directly or
85
through the use of informants who attend local mosques and gather
86
information from weekly sermons to Muslim communities.
Using
these techniques, the officers have infiltrated dozens of mosques and
87
NYPD officers file daily reports on
analyzed hundreds of them.
innocuous behavior they observe at cafés, restaurants, and other public
88
locations.
They also talk to “store owners to determine their
ethnicities and gauge their views” and join clubs and cricket teams in
89
ethnic neighborhoods. And just as the LAPD had intended to do with

been in place since 1985. See David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering
in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123,
151 (2010); Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79; see also Chris Hawley, Barbara
Handschu Likens NYPD Syping on Muslims to Spying on Free Speech Advocates,
HUFFINGTON POST (New York), Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/17/innypd-spying-a-yippie-l_n_1099479.html (stating that “Cohen . . . asked Judge Charles Haight
to loosen the Handschu rules” just “[o]ne day after the first anniversary of the attacks”). The
unit now employs “16 officers speaking at least five languages, [and] is the only squad of its
kind known to be operating in the country.” Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Documents:
NYPD Spied on Area Muslims’ Ordinary Lives, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 1, 2011,
at 5 [hereinafter Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents].
81. See, e.g., Michael Powell, In a Post-9/11 City, a Person’s Language Can Be a Cause
for Police Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at A17 (describing activities conducted by
the NYPD’s intelligence unit “earlier this summer” in 2012, such as “eavesdropp[ing] on
thousands of conversations between Muslims in restaurants and stores in New York City and
New Jersey and on Long Island”).
82. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79.
83. Undercover officers became known as “rakers,” following a comment from Cohen to
his subordinates that he wanted the unit to “rake the coals [of New York City], looking for
hot spots.” Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 1, 5. Officers are matched to ethnic neighborhoods using data from the U.S.
Census Bureau—a process that prompted officers to begin calling the unit the “Demographic
Unit.” Id. at 5.
85. Officers recruited informants by arresting them for outstanding warrants or traffic
violations, and then using the arrests as leverage. Chuck Bennett, NYPD Has Shadowy Spy
Guys, N.Y. POST, Aug. 25, 2011, at 12.
86. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79.
87. Kimberly Dozier & Matt Apuzzo, CIA Probing Legality of Its Work with NYPD:
Agency Helped Undercover Cops Spy on Muslim Communities, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Sept. 14, 2011, at 3.
88. See id.
89. Chris Hawley, Muslim Leaders: NYPD Spying Wrecks Mayor’s Goodwill, STAR-
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its now-abandoned mapping plan, the NYPD uses this information—
along with a list of “ancestries of interest”—to map the metropolitan
90
area’s ethnic neighborhoods.
The surveillance and intelligence
gathering that officers perform for the unit’s investigations even
91
occasionally takes them beyond the city limits.
92
After the program became public, the NYPD, the CIA, and New
York City officials began the elaborate dance of denying the most
93
controversial elements of the program, such as racial profiling, while
asserting that police needed to do everything within their power to
94
protect the city from future attacks. As with the LAPD’s mapping
plan, it was not long before the tide of public opinion began to turn
95
against the program. But unlike in Los Angeles, officials in New York
City were not so quick to scrap the program, perhaps because the
memories of September 11, 2001, were more vivid closer to the site of
96
the terrorist attacks. City Council members questioned New York
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 30, 2011, at 29.
90. Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 80. The so-called “ancestries of
interest” are from twenty-eight countries, “nearly all [of which are] heavily Muslim”—though
the mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, asserted that the NYPD does not factor
religion into policing tactics. Id.
91. According to some reports, NYPD intelligence officers have operated as far afield as
New Jersey, upstate New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. See, e.g., id.;
Bennett, supra note 85.
92. The program became public through a series of investigative reports by the
Associated Press. See, e.g., Apuzzo & Goldman, Documents, supra note 80.
93. NYPD Confirms CIA Advisory Role on ‘Trade Craft Issues,’ USA TODAY, Aug.
26, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-08-26/NYPD-confirms-CIAadvisory-role-on-trade-craft-issues/50143402.
94. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79. Some, such as CIA spokesperson
Jennifer Youngblood, portrayed the CIA–NYPD partnership as matter-of-fact (“‘It should
not be a surprise to anyone that, after 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency stepped up its
cooperation with law enforcement on counterterrorism issues or that some of that increased
cooperation was in New York . . . .’”), while others, such as NYPD spokesperson Paul
Browne, were literally unapologetic (“‘The New York Police Department is doing everything
it can to make sure there’s not another 9/11 here and that more innocent New Yorkers are
not killed by terrorists . . . . And we have nothing to apologize for in that regard.’”). Id.
95. See id. (reporting that “the Council on American–Islamic Relations, a leading
Muslim civil rights organization, called on the Justice Department to investigate”); Adam
Goldman & Eileen Sullivan, N.Y. Police Build Database of Immigrant Life, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Sept. 23, 2011, at 2 (reporting that state Representative Rush Holt has also
urged the U.S. Justice Department to investigate the NYPD’s program); Hawley, supra note
89 (reporting that Islamic religious and civic leaders feel that the NYPD surveillance program
has cost Mayor Michael Bloomberg the goodwill he generated by supporting a controversial
Islamic center near the World Trade Center site).
96. See generally Jesse Washington, In N.Y., Taking Surveillance in Stride, STAR-
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Police Commissioner Ray Kelly about the program at a hearing in
97
October 2011, but were apparently satisfied with Kelly’s assertions that
the program is lawful. Through the middle of 2012, various civil liberties
groups continued to speak out against the program, and a Muslim civil
rights group filed a lawsuit to restrain the NYPD’s intelligence unit from
98
spying on Muslims —but, in the interim, city officials have not yet taken
99
any action against the unit.
Adding fuel to the fire of controversy, later reports indicated the
NYPD program has so far had only mixed success. In a high-profile
defense of the NYPD, Representative Peter King of New York asserted
that the surveillance had stopped at least fourteen “terror plots” in New
100
York City since September 11, 2001. But a closer review of the cases
cited by Representative King revealed that many of the plans “may
never have existed,” or may have included “plots the NYPD had little or
101
no hand in disrupting.” The program’s surveillance efforts were hit102
and-miss too, and the program has put a strain on the relationship
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 13, 2011, at 11 (interviewing New Yorkers who express
“ambivalence” about police surveillance, weighing the “competing impulses of civic welcome
and civic safety”).
97. Joseph Goldstein, City Council Grills Kelly on Police Surveillance of Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at A23.
98. Eileen Sullivan, Muslims File Federal Suit to Stop NYPD Spying, HUFFINGTON
POST, June 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/06/nj-muslims-file-federals_0_n_1574019.html. The lawsuit, filed in June 2012, named eight New Jersey-based Muslims
as plaintiffs and is supported by Muslim Advocates, a civil rights advocacy group
headquartered in California. Id. The lawsuit was the first to be filed against the NYPD. Id.
At the time of the filing, however, a number of government officials, including the New
Jersey State Attorney General and the Obama administration’s top counterterrorism advisor,
had examined the NYPD program and concluded it was not breaking any laws. Id.
99. See NYPD Confirms CIA Advisory Role on ‘Trade Craft Issues,’ supra note 93.
100. Rep. King Demands “Uninformed” Members of Congress Stop Smearing the NYPD,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.house.gov/apps/l
ist/hearing/ny03_king/stopnypdsmear.html. The attacks supposedly foiled included plans to
destroy the Brooklyn Bridge; flood the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, which cross under the
Hudson River from New Jersey to New York City; and bomb the city’s Herald Square
subway station.
See David Morgan, Other Foiled NYC Terror Plots Since 9/11,
CBSNEWS.COM (Nov. 21, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_16257328623/other-foiled-nyc-terror-plots-since-9-11/.
101. Matt Apuzzo et al., NYPD’s Spying Programs Yielded Only Mixed Results, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 23, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/dec/23/nypdsspying-programs-yielded-only-mixed-results/. The attempted bombing of the Herald Square
subway station in 2004 was the only attack that journalists could confirm had been prevented
by the NYPD program. Id.
102. The NYPD identified several fringe groups within the Muslim community, but
failed to identify certain radical members within those organizations; large amounts of data
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between Muslim communities in New York and police, arguably
hampering the NYPD’s ability to leverage local knowledge to its
103
advantage. But the specter of another terrorist attack looms large in
New York City, and the resulting “sense of national vulnerability” has
104
enabled the program to continue operating. At the same time, many
of the news reports detailing the NYPD intelligence program—like the
LAPD’s mapping plan before it—expressed a certain breathless shock
that such widespread surveillance could happen in America, tiptoeing
around the central question: How could this happen?
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OFFERS LITTLE PROTECTION AGAINST
POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
Among the many constitutional provisions that protect individuals
from unwanted government intrusions into their day-to-day lives—and
perhaps the provision that has the most direct relevance to law
enforcement, criminal investigations, and surveillance—is the Fourth
Amendment. This Part will first discuss the historical development of
the Amendment, which will help to illuminate why the police
surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities described in the
previous Part raise constitutional issues. This Part then discusses three
relevant exceptions to the Amendment’s general rule, which illustrate
why many of the investigative tactics police use as part of their
intelligence operations are exempt from the Amendment’s protections,
and, from a constitutional perspective, generally continue unabated.
A. An Overview of the Fourth Amendment
By its own terms, the Fourth Amendment only protects against
105
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the Supreme Court has
historically held that, at least within the criminal context, a search or

were gathered about entirely innocent people; and one investigative tactic—monitoring
everyone in New York City who legally changed names—produced no results at all. Id.
103. See id. (describing how some Islamic leaders have counseled residents to avoid
reporting extremist, anti-American talk to the police because the person doing the talking is
likely a police informant); see also Harris, supra note 80, at 130 (describing how police use of
informants in Muslim neighborhoods “will cause lasting damage to efforts to bring Muslim
communities and law enforcement together to build a common cause against extremism”).
104. David Crary, 9/11 Paranoia Gives Way to Fears That We’ve Gone Too Far, STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 20, 2011, at 6 (quoting Donna Lieberman, a spokesperson for
the New York Civil Liberties Union).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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seizure is generally unreasonable if it is conducted without a warrant,
107
subject to certain exceptions.
The Amendment also prohibits the
108
issuance of warrants without probable cause, a restriction that is
important with respect to widespread police surveillance and
intelligence gathering because “searches” include not only physical
searches of premises and persons, but also, under certain circumstances,
109
the surveillance of individuals, or even the collection of information.
As we have seen, a great deal of the counterterrorism-related
intelligence gathering conducted by police in the years since September
110
11, 2001, has lacked probable cause.
While this might appear to
indicate that such intelligence gathering—and any evidence gleaned
111
from it—is barred by the Fourth Amendment, a brief survey of the
Amendment’s history reveals that there are a number of exceptions to
the Amendment’s rule that allow police to conduct these operations
without constitutional consequence.
B. Historical Development of the Fourth Amendment
Although the Fourth Amendment was inspired by a lively period of
112
revolution and political protest,
it received little attention in

106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that, with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, a search is unreasonable when it is “conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate”).
107. The relevant exceptions are discussed later in this Part. There are many other
exceptions that are not discussed in this Comment, primarily because they either apply
outside of the criminal context or because they have no application to surveillance and
intelligence gathering. See infra Part III.C.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
109. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements . . . the
Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches
and seizures”).
110. See supra Part II.B.
111. The primary method by which the Fourth Amendment’s protections are enforced is
the so-called exclusionary rule, which prohibits the government from using evidence that was
obtained through a search or seizure that violates the Amendment; this rule was established
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 398 (1914). In 1961, the Supreme Court decided
in Mapp v. Ohio that the Fourth Amendment—and with it, the exclusionary rule—also
applied to state governments by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
112. The Fourth Amendment’s origins can be traced to the writs of assistance, or general
search warrants, frequently used by authorities in Great Britain’s American colonies.
Rachael A. Lynch, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Fourth Amendment Right: Samson
Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees Lose Fourth
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constitutional jurisprudence for most of its first 100 years. It was not
114
until Boyd v. United States, in 1886, that it became clear the
Amendment protected individuals from unwarranted government
115
From the time Boyd was
intrusions upon their private property.
decided until 1928, however, the Fourth Amendment was limited in that
116
it only protected the “physical invasion of a protected space” —and the
Court’s strict adherence to this principle unwittingly set in motion
events that would lead to our modern conception of the Fourth
Amendment.
In 1928, the Court decided the landmark case of Olmstead v. United
117
States, in which federal agents—without a warrant—used a telephone
wiretap over several months to discover that Olmstead and his
colleagues were conspiring to distribute liquor in violation of the
118
National Prohibition Act.
The Court refused to grant Olmstead the
Fourth Amendment’s protections, distinguishing his case—where there
was no physical intrusion of the premises—from past cases where there

Amendment Protection, 41 AKRON L. REV. 651, 654 (2008). Authorized by the Townshend
Revenue Act, 1767, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.), the writs allowed royal customs agents “to enter
and go into any House, Warehouse, Shop, Cellar, or other Place, in the British Colonies or
Plantations in America” as part of their duties. The writs were most famously used in the case
of Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 489, in which a printer responsible for a
pamphlet critical of King George III became the target of one of the writs—as well as a cause
célèbre among the American colonists and one of the most significant influences on the
drafting of the Fourth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 772 & nn.53–54 (1994).
113. Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV.
687, 700 (2011). Possible reasons for this might be that the Fourth Amendment did not yet
apply against the states; and there were few federal crimes. Id. at 701.
114. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
115. In Boyd, the Court considered the constitutionality of a series of laws that had been
passed in the 1860s and 1870s. Id. at 621. The laws allowed the government to file an
affidavit alleging a defendant had violated “any of the revenue laws of the United States,”
and thus compel the defendant to produce related financial documents to help the
government prove its case; if the defendant did not comply, the court would accept the
allegations as true. Id. at 619–20. Although the government argued that there is no search or
seizure when the defendant is the one producing the documents, id. at 621, the Court
shrewdly noted that the law’s guilt-by-default setup offered defendants little practical choice
in the matter. Id. at 621–22. Thus, the Court declared, the government’s invasion of
“personal security, personal liberty and private property” ran afoul of the Amendment’s
protections. Id. at 630.
116. Vivek Kothari, Autobots, Decepticons, and Panopticons: The Transformative Nature
of GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 6 CRIM. L. BRIEF 37, 38 (2010).
117. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
118. Id. at 455–57.
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was an “actual entrance into the private quarters of the defendant.”
The Court bluntly concluded: “The Amendment does not forbid what
was done here. There was no searching . . . . The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of
120
the houses or offices of the defendants.” The Court thus staked itself
to its rule that the Amendment protected against government intrusions
only in the case of intrusions into physical premises, and, in the process,
ensured the Amendment “was not an evolving instrument of privacy
121
protection”—especially with respect to new technologies.
Four decades later, perhaps recognizing that “the continuing vitality
122
of Olmstead was in serious doubt,” the Court finally put the physical123
premises rule to bed. In 1967, the Court decided Katz v. United States,
124
ushering in the modern era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In
125
Katz, police suspected the defendant of violating the Wire Act, and, as
part of their investigation, eavesdropped on Katz’s telephone calls
126
without a warrant. As a result of the evidence police obtained through
127
this warrantless surveillance, Katz was found guilty on all counts. Katz
appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, asking the Court to
119. Id. at 464.
120. Id. There was no entry into the defendants’ houses or offices because the
government had attached its wiretap to external telephone wires leading into the buildings.
Id. at 457.
121. Marceau, supra note 113, at 703–04; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49
(1967) (“The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these
[electronic eavesdropping] advances in scientific knowledge.”).
122. Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of
Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1516 (2010). As the Supreme Court
noted in Berger, the tide began to turn against Olmstead and its progeny in 1963, when the
Court recognized for the first time in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), that
“verbal evidence may be the fruit of official illegality under the Fourth Amendment.” 388
U.S. at 52.
123. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
124. See Kothari, supra note 116, at 38–39 (providing a brief history of the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, which summarizes Katz as the last case that led to the “modern
search and seizure doctrine”).
125. The Wire Act prohibits the interstate transmission by wire of information involving
bets or wagers. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006).
126. FBI agents attached microphones to the tops of two out of three telephone booths
in a bank of three booths that Katz was known to use; the third booth was disabled by the
telephone company. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966). The agents then
watched the phone booths, and activated the microphones whenever Katz was in one of the
booths—enabling them to obtain a record of Katz’s end of the phone calls, which involved
“the placing of bets and the obtaining of gambling information” by Katz. Id.
127. Id.
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determine “[w]hether physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area is necessary before a search” violates the Fourth
128
Amendment’s protections.
But the Court, led by Justice Stewart,
discarded Katz’s formulation of the issue, almost matter-of-factly
asserting instead that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
129
places.” The Court acknowledged that Olmstead could “no longer be
regarded as controlling,” and that the evidence obtained by means of
the wiretap was inadmissible because it was obtained without a
130
warrant.
Although Justice Stewart’s majority opinion invalidated the
Olmstead line of case law, it never established a clear rule subsequent
131
courts might use in place of Olmstead.
Instead, later courts have
followed the standard laid out by Justice Harlan in his concurring
132
opinion, in which he agreed with the majority that the Amendment
protects “people, not places,” but asserted that its protections could only
be invoked if a two-part test was satisfied: “[F]irst that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
133
‘reasonable.’”
Justice Harlan’s test—whether the defendant had a “reasonable
expectation of privacy”—has become, for better or for worse, the
134
modern standard for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In what
might be seen as an improvement over the Olmstead standard, Katz
135
rejects stagnation and is “inherently non-static[,] . . . derived from
136
But the Court’s
evolving social norms, practices, and expectations.”
increasing focus on reasonableness has also meant the Court has found
that, under certain circumstances, an individual’s expectation of privacy
was not reasonable—and thus that law enforcement was able to carry

128. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
129. Id. at 348–51. The Court famously went on: “What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 353, 356–57.
131. Kothari, supra note 116, at 39.
132. Id.
133. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
134. Marceau, supra note 113, at 705.
135. Id. at 710.
136. Id. at 705.
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out actions that might otherwise offend the Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, many of the police activities conducted as part of the
widespread surveillance and intelligence gathering operations described
138
in Part II fall into these gaps in the Amendment’s protections.
In
short, “the shifting meaning of the Fourth Amendment that was
adopted in Katz has come to be seen as a threat as well as a benefit to
139
civil liberties.” This Comment addresses three of these exceptions in
the following section.
C. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s General Rule
1. Public Vantages
Before Katz, when the Fourth Amendment still only protected
physical spaces, rather than individuals, courts had long recognized that
140
“the eye cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass.”
And though the core
Fourth Amendment doctrine has since undergone various twists and
turns, the Court has consistently held that, as long as police are “lawfully
present at a location,” visual surveillance is generally not a “search”
within the context of the Amendment, and therefore does not invoke its
141
This is true even though technology and police tactics
protections.
have greatly improved law enforcement’s ability to conduct visual
142
surveillance, such that today there are still only two categories of cases
where the Court has limited the scope of the public-vantage exception:
(1) cases in which law enforcement’s use of surveillance technology
143
allows officers to “exceed” normal levels of perception, and (2) cases
137. See infra notes 180–85 and accompanying text.
138. See infra Part III.C (discussing three of the exemptions to the Fourth Amendment’s
General Rule—public vantages, assumption of the risk, and third parties).
139. Id. at 138.
140. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886).
141. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 22–23 & n.134 (2006) (noting that the principles underlying
the idea that visual inspections are not searches date to 1765). This has remained largely true,
even though the Court has subsequently been actively involved in deciding visual surveillance
cases. See Marissa A. Lalli, Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace
and a Call for a New Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 271 (2011)
(noting that, post-Katz, the Court “became increasingly concerned” with methods that law
enforcement used to gather information about the subjects of its surveillance).
142. See Clancy, supra note 141, at 33 (noting that the Court’s “cautions and concerns
about [new technologies] . . . have rarely been translated into labeling the employment of the
technology . . . as a search”).
143. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); see also Andrew Riggs Dunlap,
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in which law enforcement relies on technology that is not in “general
144
public use.”
The first category—ruling out surveillance technology that allows
officers to exceed normal levels of visual perception—might seem to
disqualify most applications of the public-vantage doctrine altogether.
But the Court has been careful to distinguish between those
technologies that exceed normal levels of perception and those that
merely enhance perception, restricting only the former while still
145
allowing the latter.
In fact, the Court has drawn the line between
enhancing and exceeding normal levels of perception such that a great
146
deal of surveillance technology is still constitutionally permissible. As

Note, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade Secret Law: A Response to Kyllo v. United
States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2181–84 (2002) (discussing the Court’s concerns with sense
exceeding technology absent concerns about public use of the equipment).
144. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
145. See Dunlap, supra note 143, at 2183 (“Technologies that allowed the government to
‘see’ more clearly did not offend the Fourth Amendment.”). A famous pair of Fourth
Amendment cases illustrates the difference between enhancing and exceeding normal levels
of perception. In United States v. Knotts, the Court allowed police to track a criminal suspect
to his secret lair using a radio beeper hidden in a drum of chemicals the suspect was
transporting. 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983). The Court said that no constitutional issues were
involved, because the police could have just as easily used visual surveillance to track the
suspect. Id. at 285. In United States v. Karo, however, police used a similar radio beeper to
track the movements of a container of ether inside of a home; the Court held this was a search
because “the police used the beeper to ‘see’ what they could not see unaided.” Lalli, supra
note 141, at 272 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714, 719–21 (1984)).
The wrench in the works is the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones,
in which it held the use of a GPS device to track a criminal suspect’s vehicle amounted to a
search protected by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949
(2012). In Jones, police attached a GPS device to the bottom of the vehicle Jones was driving
and tracked the vehicle for four weeks; the government later used this evidence to convict
Jones of various drug-related crimes. Id. at 948. The Court distinguished Jones from Knotts
and Karo, writing that in the two earlier cases, the defendants accepted the GPS device into
their possession (albeit unknowingly), while in Jones, the police placed the device directly
onto Jones’s vehicle. Id. at 952. At the core of this analysis is the Court’s insistence that
Katz’s “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the [preKatz] common-law trespassory test.” Id. Commentators were quick to seize on the Court’s
decision in Jones as a “signal event in Fourth Amendment history”—though it may take some
time before we fully understand whether, and how, it alters the analysis here. Adam Liptak,
Justices Reject GPS Tracking in a Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at A1.
146. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986) (allowing
the use of an aerial surveillance camera and photographic magnification that could detect
“wires as small as 1/2-inch in diameter”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)
(upholding federal agents’ airplane surveillance of the defendant’s marijuana crop from an
altitude of 1,000 feet); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (ruling that a police
officer who shined a flashlight into a stopped car “trenched upon no right secured to the
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a result, this is not quite the broad restriction it may have initially
appeared to be.
The second category in which the Court has said police cannot rely
on the public vantage doctrine—when their surveillance employs
147
technology that is not in general public use —finds its rationale in
Katz’s rule that the Fourth Amendment protects defendants who have a
148
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” But while this rule may appear
fair in principle—defendants cannot be expected to take measures to
protect their privacy against modes of intrusion of which they are
149
unaware—it is also limited in practice. For as soon as defendants gain
awareness of a certain type of technology, the implication is that “they
are [then] responsible for protecting themselves from its possible
150
invasions.”
Clearly, when it comes to widespread surveillance and intelligence
gathering, the public-vantage doctrine is an enormous asset for law
enforcement; even taking into account the limits described here, police
may still conduct virtually unlimited visual surveillance of their subjects
without offending the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.
[defendant] by the Fourth Amendment”); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952)
(allowing the “use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope”); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927) (ruling that the U.S. Coast Guard’s use of a searchlight to spot a boat at sea
“is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass” and “is not prohibited by the
Constitution”).
147. The Court first formalized this category of cases in Kyllo v. United States, in which
federal agents suspected the defendant of growing marijuana inside his house; to determine
whether this was likely to be true, the agents scanned the defendant’s house with a thermal
imager, hoping to detect heat signatures typical of the high-intensity lamps used in marijuana
cultivation. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). When the imager revealed heat signatures, the agents
obtained a search warrant and seized more than 100 marijuana plants from the defendant’s
residence. Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 115 (2004). On appeal, the Court ruled that the use
of the imager constituted a search because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding information about the interior of his house that the agents were only able to
obtain using technology not in general public use. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology
in question is not in general public use.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
512 (1961))).
148. See Kamin, supra note 147, at 113 (noting that, when the risk of an invasion of
privacy “is one that defendants face from their peers, their failure to protect themselves from
it is an indication that they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 115.
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For example, police may use binoculars, cameras with telephoto lenses,
151
or perhaps even remotely operated surveillance cameras to view the
subjects of their surveillance at closer range without the subjects’
knowledge, provided that such cameras only allow the police to see what
they could have otherwise seen unaided, and that there is a public
152
awareness of the technology at issue.
But the intelligence gathering that police forces like those in Los
Angeles and New York City are conducting in the wake of September
11 may not even go that far. In many cases, news reports indicate that
human intelligence, rather than technology, is the main component of
153
these police departments’ efforts, and officers focus on collecting
information about daily life simply by being present at cafes, bookstores,
154
mosques, cricket matches, and many other such places —public
vantages if ever there were any.
2. Assumption of Risk
Another tactic that police commonly use as part of widespread
surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations is to employ
informants within the neighborhoods and community groups subject to
155
surveillance.
Through the use of such informants, police can gather
detailed information about neighborhoods, individuals, and
organizations that might otherwise be inaccessible or difficult to target
156
with visual surveillance conducted from public vantage points.
Within the context of widespread surveillance and intelligence
gathering, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows police to
151. See supra notes 35, 38 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part II.B.1–2. In fact, some residents of the areas under surveillance may
be imagining a greater use of technology than is actually taking place—which leads one to
wonder whether these individuals might be inadvertently undermining their own Fourth
Amendment protections by expecting less privacy than what they actually enjoy. See Kaplan,
supra note 11, at 44, 46 (“Suspicion of spying is so rife among antiwar activists . . . that some
begin meetings by welcoming undercover cops who might be present.”).
154. See Hawley, supra note 89 (noting police spying in on cricket games, in ethnic clubs,
in bookstores, and in cafes); Apuzzo et al., supra note 101 (noting undercover police
investigation at mosques).
155. In New York City, for example, reports indicate that police will often arrest Muslim
residents for traffic violations or outstanding warrants and then use the arrests as leverage for
convincing those individuals to become police informants. See Bennet, supra note 85.
156. See Harris, supra note 80, at 168 (suggesting that the use of informants in Muslim
communities enables police to obtain the “maximum possible flow of intelligence on potential
terrorist threats”).
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make broad use of informants “at any point, and for any reason, without
157
judicial supervision.” The reason for this is the so-called assumptionof-risk doctrine—occasionally also called the misplaced-confidences
158
doctrine —under which the Courts have found that those who fall
victim to police informants generally cannot invoke their Fourth
159
160
Amendment rights, for both procedural and substantive reasons.
And while the idea of assumption of risk may be a “curious way to
161
discuss the use of informants” —more intuitively, informants act as
government agents in all but name—the doctrine was firmly established
through a series of three Supreme Court decisions handed down in the
162
163
1960s and early 1970s: Lopez v. United States, Hoffa v. United States,
157. Id. at 142.
158. Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1529.
159. Procedurally, like nearly all constitutional provisions, the Fourth Amendment only
limits government conduct, not conduct by private actors, and because any alleged invasion of
privacy in this context occurs as a result of the informant’s actions, there is no government
conduct at issue. See Harris, supra note 80, at 144 (“Because intelligence gathered by
informants is categorized as a result of assumed risk rather than a result of police action, the
Fourth Amendment does not regulate the gathering of such evidence.”)
160. Substantively, by revealing previously secret information in public (such as by
telling it to an informant), individuals must “assume[] the risk that their secrets [will] end up
in the possession of the government,” and therefore lose any reasonable expectation of
privacy they may have had—a key element for claiming Fourth Amendment protections in
the post-Katz era. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption
Create a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?,” 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 511 (2001); see also
supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
161. Harris, supra note 80, at 142–43.
162. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In Lopez, an IRS inspector confronted
Lopez about nonpayment of taxes on the hotel Lopez owned, whereupon Lopez offered the
inspector a bribe to clear the delinquency. Id. at 429–30. The inspector reported the bribe to
his superiors, and also recorded subsequent conversations with Lopez in which Lopez offered
the inspector additional bribes. Id. at 430–31. A jury later found Lopez guilty of bribery on
this evidence. Id. at 434. Lopez argued on appeal that this evidence—the recorded
conversations and the inspector’s reports to his superiors—was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, id. at 437, but the Court noted that the inspector was present by Lopez’s
consent, and concluded that “the risk [Lopez] took in offering a bribe . . . fairly included the
risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court.” Id. at 439.
163. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa involved the union boss James
Hoffa, who, while on trial for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, met with various union
officials in his hotel room and discussed plans to bribe the jury. Id. at 294, 296. Hoffa was
unaware that one of these officials, Edward Partin, was relaying Hoffa’s conversations to
federal agents, who then used this evidence to convict Hoffa of attempted bribery. Id. at 296.
Although Hoffa acknowledged that he disclosed his bribery plans to Partin willingly, Hoffa
argued on appeal that this “consent” should be vitiated because he did not know Partin would
later convey his words to the government as an informant. Id. at 300. Relying on Lopez, the
Court responded that it had never “expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects
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164

and United States v. White.
It is apparent from this line of cases that, although this doctrine is
“fairly straightforward,” it nevertheless has “serious implications” for
165
the privacy of the targets of police intelligence-gathering operations.
Doubtless some of the doctrine’s side effects are desirable when it
comes to genuinely illegal conspiracies, giving criminals and terrorists
166
alike considerable pause before they consort with one another. But in
the case of widespread intelligence-gathering and surveillance efforts,
such as those discussed in this Comment, these side effects will spill over
onto the vast number of citizens who are not engaged in any kind of
criminal activities. Because the Court has chosen to focus its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence only on the privacy rights of individuals, and

a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it.” Id. at 302. Somewhat ominously, the Court concluded, “[t]he risk of
being . . . betrayed by an informer . . . is probably inherent in the conditions of human
society[, and] is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.” Id. at 303
(quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
164. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White, the defendant was convicted
of engaging in illegal transactions involving narcotics, and much of the evidence against White
came from conversations between White and an informant that were relayed to government
agents by a radio transmitter concealed on the informant’s person. Id. at 746–47. Given that
the Court had by now held in Katz that warrantless wiretaps were an invasion of an
individual’s privacy, 389 U.S. at 358–59—a decision that had not previously been in place for
the defendants in Lopez and Hoffa—White argued on appeal that, without a warrant, using
an informant who was wearing a wire was similarly impermissible. See White, 401 U.S. at 749
(“The Court of Appeals understood Katz to render inadmissible against White the agents’
testimony concerning conversations that [the informant] broadcast to them.”). But the Court
once again refused to apply the Amendment, reasoning that “[i]f the law gives no protection
to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it
protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are
later offered in evidence to prove the State’s case.” Id. at 752. The Court thus concluded
that, like Lopez and Hoffa before him, White had no reasonable (or “constitutionally
justifiable”) expectation of privacy, and could not shield himself with the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 751–53.
165. See Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1529. The author asserts “serious implications”
only with respect to privacy in the context of social networking, id., but given the breadth of
the doctrine, its implications are clearly serious for privacy in any context.
166. Justice White eloquently described the doctrine’s effect on the economy for
criminal conspirators in United States v. White when he wrote,
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if
he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
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167

not the shared privacy of groups, and because the police have almost
unlimited license to use informants, this broader result can hardly be
called desirable. As the size of a person’s social network increases, so
too does the risk that an acquaintance may be a police informant,
forcing individuals to be unnecessarily selective in the acquaintances
168
they make —and leaving them with no recourse against the
government in the event that even this level of heightened suspicion
turns out to be misguided.
3. Third Parties
In addition to the police tactics discussed in the previous two
sections (visual surveillance and the use of informants), a hallmark of
the intelligence operations being established within local law
enforcement agencies post-September 11 is a strong focus on datamining—gathering vast amounts of data from which police analysts
might discern behavioral patterns and cultural norms that help to
169
identify and prevent the next terrorist attack.
The information in
police databases could potentially come from not only surveillance
reports and informants, but also from independent third parties, such as
170
telephone companies, banks, and even the U.S. Census Bureau.
Although several commentators have argued that data-mining has yet to
prove itself a viable tool in law enforcement’s counterterrorism
171
172
toolkit, it remains a fixture of intelligence efforts.
167. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136–37 (2002).
168. See Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1529–30 (noting that the only way a person may
protect himself from informants is to select his friends with care, and that “there is a direct
relationship between the number of recipients [of information] and the risk that one or more
of them will use the information . . . in a way harmful to the communicator”).
169. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 316 (11th ed. 2011)
(defining data-mining as: “the practice of searching through large amounts of computerized
data to find useful patterns or trends”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV.
741, 746 (noting that data mining “was given a huge boost after September 11, 2001, when
[law enforcement’s] attention focused on tracking terrorist networks”).
170. See Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Spies, supra note 79 (documenting NYPD’s usage
of surveillance reports and informants); Winton, Outcry, supra note 50 (explaining the
LAPD’s use of U.S. Census bureau information to plan its mapping project); infra note 180
(explaining the Court’s holding in Miller that banks can give out people’s records, as they
have no right of privacy in those records); infra note 182 (explaining Court’s holding in Smith
that a person has no right of privacy over their phone records held by their telephone
companies).
171. Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
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Most of this information is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protections because of the third-party doctrine, which holds that “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
173
voluntarily turns over to third parties.” A cousin of the assumption174
of-risk doctrine—both count Hoffa among their ancestors —the thirdparty doctrine is one of the most criticized exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s scope, and there have been numerous calls to overhaul or
175
eliminate it.
But much like the data-mining it permits, the doctrine
appears to be here to stay. The Court has refused to find that many
common data-mining practices implicate constitutionally protected
privacy rights; instead, the Court has left the work of creating
boundaries to Congress, which has done so selectively and not always
176
successfully.
The doctrine got its start in Katz, where the Court issued its nowfamous statement that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
177
public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,” and the
178
179
Court also hinted at the doctrine in Hoffa, Couch v. United States,
180
and United States v. Miller. But the doctrine truly ripened in Smith v.
343, 362 (2008) [hereinafter Data Mining].
172. See id. at 353. This is partly because of successful marketing campaigns by database
companies, id., but also because past experience has shown that, at least in theory, datamining could prevent terrorist attacks. See BJELOPERA, supra note 77.
173. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); see Petrashek, supra note 122,
at 1518–19 (discussing the implications of the Smith decision).
174. See Lalli, supra note 141, at 259 (noting that the Court relied on the third-party
doctrine in Hoffa).
175. See, e.g., Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1381, 1382 (2008) (calling Smith “regrettable”); Lalli, supra note 141, at 261–64
(summarizing three different critiques of the third-party doctrine, the common theme of
which is that the doctrine is “outdated”).
176. See infra Part IV.A.
177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
178. Though the Court in Hoffa conducted its analysis primarily using the language of
risk, it emphasized that Hoffa took no measures to conceal his conversations from third
parties. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (noting that “every conversation
[the informant] heard was either directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence”).
179. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–336 (1973); see David S. Barnhill, Note,
Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 627-28 (2010) (describing the Court’s holding in Couch that a
woman’s reasonable expectation of privacy in her tax records “vanished” once she gave them
to an accountant).
180. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–443 (1976); see Lalli, supra note 141, at
260 (describing the Court’s holding in Miller that a bank customer “had no protectable
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his bank records because they were held by third
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181

Maryland, such that a party now essentially relinquishes his privacy
interest in a piece of information at the same time he relinquishes the
182
information itself.
183
The third-party doctrine has held up in subsequent court decisions,
and it has become particularly worrisome to civil liberties advocates in a
digital era in which individuals transmit large amounts of data and
184
information across the Internet. By uploading files to Internet services
like Facebook, Twitter, Craigslist, Google, and others, individuals
transfer that information to third parties and, in theory, relinquish their
Fourth Amendment-protected privacy interests in the information.
While in principle the question of whether individuals relinquish
their Fourth Amendment protections under these circumstances is an
185
open question, in practice it may be a different matter. Some have
noted that, in Smith, the Court took pains to establish a
“content/envelope distinction”—when transferring information to a
third party, a person loses their privacy interest only in the “envelope”
(the part of the information used by the third party for handling
purposes, such as the telephone digits in Smith) and not in the content
(the “hidden” part of the message, such as the actual, audible telephone

parties”).
181. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In Smith, the victim of a robbery reported
“receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the
robber.” Id. at 737. Police used information from the victim to identify Smith as the suspect,
and then, without a warrant, asked the telephone company to install a pen register to record
the numbers dialed on the telephone at Smith’s house. Id. When Smith once again called the
victim, police were able to match the numbers dialed by Smith to the call received by the
victim, evidence that eventually led to Smith’s conviction. Id. at 737–38. Smith sought to
suppress the pen register as an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, id. at
737, but on appeal the Court said that Smith had no legitimate expectation of privacy with
respect to the numbers he dialed on his phone. Id. at 742. Given that most telephone users
realize they must “convey” the numbers they dial to a telephone company in order to place a
call, the Court concluded it was “too much to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.” Id. at 742–43.
182. See id. at 743–45.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that “a
person who places trash at a curb to be disposed of or destroyed by a third person
[renounces] . . . ‘any reasonable expectation of privacy in the property abandoned’” (quoting
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972))).
184. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1531
(2010) (noting that files uploaded to third-party Internet sites could fall outside of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment Pragmatism].
185. The Supreme Court has not yet decided “whether and how the third-party doctrine
applies to Internet communications.” Petrashek, supra note 122, at 1520.
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186

conversation in Smith). Like telephone calls, Internet communications
have envelope and content components, suggesting that a consistent
application of the third-party doctrine would recognize at least some
Fourth Amendment protections in messages being sent and documents
being uploaded. But many other scholars have noted the sheer breadth
187
of the third-party doctrine, which in addition to offering little hope for
defendants, also makes it difficult for commentators to predict how (or
even whether) the Court will adapt it to meet the realities of the
188
Internet-era docket.
Indeed, many of those same scholars have predicted the Court will
continue to apply the doctrine “to all personal information possessed by
189
third parties,” and they do not appear to be wrong. The Court has
made no moves to reverse course in this area, and in the current political
climate, “[t]he scale is rigged so that security will win out [over civil
190
liberties] nearly all the time.”
As a result, at least from a Fourth
Amendment standpoint, there is no restriction on the police’s ability to
gather large amounts of data that individuals have disclosed to third
parties. The third-party doctrine may be a gold mine for police in their
efforts to establish widespread intelligence networks, but the constant
transfer of information that characterizes modern society means that the
doctrine also exposes vast numbers of Americans to potential privacy
invasions while giving them little realistic opportunity to call the
government to account.
IV. THE NEXT-BEST THING—PRIVACY FROM WIDESPREAD POLICE
SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING BEYOND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Though the Fourth Amendment may offer individuals little
protection against the investigative practices of police intelligence units,
there are still other ways that individuals might preserve their privacy.

186. See Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as
E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (2008) (analyzing the envelope/content
distinction with respect to telephone calls and postal mail).
187. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common
Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1200 (2009).
188. See, e.g., Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, supra note 184, at 1531–32 (noting the
debate of whether and how the third-party doctrine applies to Internet cases is “difficult to
resolve because the Supreme Court’s decisions are incoherent”).
189. Id. at 1531.
190. Data Mining, supra note 171, at 362.
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This Part discusses what might be considered the best alternative to
constitutional protections—statutory restrictions on police surveillance
and intelligence gathering. This Part first seeks to explain why statutes
are a legitimate alternative to constitutional protections, and then
discusses the competing interests—individual privacy and national
security—that must be addressed in any potential statute limiting police
conduct in this area.
A. Legislative Definitions of Privacy Augment Constitutional
Definitions
As the previous Part illustrates, today’s constitutional notions of
privacy and the Fourth Amendment’s protections of those notions are
191
relatively narrow in scope, having receded from the high point of Katz
thanks to the variety of exceptions that the Court has carved out in the
intervening years. Fortunately for individuals who may be subject to
police surveillance, privacy law in the United States is “vast and
complex,” and includes not only the Fourth Amendment, but “dozens of
192
federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state privacy statutes.”
It is true the Fourth Amendment is unquestionably the most
important of these laws, the cornerstone of privacy in America. But it is
also, to continue the metaphor, the foundation of privacy in America,
laid by the courts as a starting point upon which additional limitations
193
and regulations may be built.
History supports this idea. After the
Supreme Court decided in Olmstead in 1928 that wiretapping was not
194
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protections, Congress soon moved
to fill the gap, passing the Communications Act of 1934, which placed
195
significant restrictions on wiretapping. When the Court later decided

191. See Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1474 (2008) (describing constitutional privacy protection as narrow in
the United States, especially when compared to equivalent protections in Europe).
192. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2006)
[hereinafter Taxonomy of Privacy]; see also Katie Stenman, State Government Information
Collection: The Shutdown of the MATRIX Program, REAL ID, and DNA Collection, 2 I/S:
J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC. 547, 548 (2006) (“Ten state constitutions explicitly recognize a right
to privacy, and many states have additional laws protecting various types of privacy. . . . State
laws protect these different types of privacy to varying degrees.”).
193. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858 (2004) (noting that “courts have
successfully created rules that establish important privacy rights in many areas”).
194. See supra notes 116–20.
195. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581,
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that wiretaps did fall under the Fourth Amendment in Katz, Congress
augmented this position with additional rules in Title III of the Omnibus
197
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
More recently, in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed a number of
other laws establishing privacy protections beyond those offered by the
Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, many of them in
198
response to decisions handed down by the Court.
The most
noteworthy law to come out of this period is the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which was originally enacted to
199
protect Americans’ privacy interests in their e-mail, but has since been
amended to bring other forms of technological information under its
200
In contrast to the Court’s reluctance to develop
umbrella as well.
specific privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment, Congress
and the state legislatures have been quite active in this area.
Despite this activity, the resulting statutes provide what is best
described as a patchwork of protection of individuals’ privacy interests.
201
There is no general privacy law in the United States, only laws that
guard certain privacy interests in certain types of information or
202
contexts.
One possible rationale behind this scheme is that, in most
cases, when individuals relinquish private information about themselves,
they do so in a contract-like exchange in which they are able to
negotiate the terms and assess whether the loss of privacy is worth the

591–92 (2011). Despite the noble intentions behind the Communications Act, however, it
appears the Act was less than successful in achieving its desired end, as the FBI was able to
continue its widespread use of wiretaps even after the Act was passed. Id. at 592.
196. See supra notes 106, 109.
197. See Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 492–93 (summarizing Title III’s
requirement that “law enforcement officials [must] obtain a warrant before wiretapping,” and
its prohibition on the private use of wiretaps).
198. See Kerr, supra note 193, at 855–56 (summarizing a number of privacy laws passed
by Congress during this period).
199. Id. at 856 (“Congress protected the privacy of stored e-mails and Internet
communications by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.”).
200. Id. at 871. The law has been amended eleven times since 1986, although some of
these amendments were admittedly “minor technical amendments.” Id.
201. See Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal Information
Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
307, 338 (2008).
202. Id. (noting several, including: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) for medical records; the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) for
financial records; and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), for
information collected from children on the Internet).
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203

consideration they will receive in return; privacy legislation exists only
to level the playing field in those situations where individuals lack the
204
ability to negotiate.
The other reason why this scheme may exist is
that Congress prefers to legislate only when necessary, waiting until the
205
Court has defined a particular contour of the Fourth Amendment.
But this is a less-than-ideal approach, because, like most constitutional
provisions, the Amendment is better used as a tool for evaluating
206
statutes than for prescribing rules to fill the void.
Whatever the
reasons behind this scheme, the point remains: Existing statutory
protections of privacy—though they provide broader coverage than the
Fourth Amendment—still leave unregulated many of the police
surveillance and intelligence-gathering tactics discussed in this
Comment.
That does not mean, however, we should abandon the legislature as
a hope for better privacy protections, resigning ourselves to exploring
the nooks and crannies of Fourth Amendment case law in search of
some way of preserving individuals’ privacy against widespread police
surveillance. Far from it. Although a number of scholars believe the
207
judiciary is in the best position to guide privacy doctrine, Professor
208
Orin Kerr has made a convincing case that the legislative approach is

203. See id. at 336–38 (suggesting that federal personal-privacy law is based on contract
law and discussing the process of bargaining away personal data in the private market).
204. See id. at 336–37 (noting that the statutory framework for privacy in the United
States “appears to be predicated on ideas from contract law” but that “Congress was willing
to enact privacy legislation for the government, because people often lack a meaningful
choice when dealing with the government”). For example, it is well understood that if an
individual buys a product over the Internet, she must relinquish private information about
herself—name, address, credit card number—to obtain the product. The possibility that the
vendor will expose this information to the public is low, and is offset by the convenience of
online shopping. If the Internet vendor does mishandle her information, then she can easily
choose not to do business with that vendor in the future. But the same individual has no
ability to negotiate with the government, or take her “business” elsewhere if the government
uses her information for ends to which she did not consent.
205. See Tokson, supra note 195, at 596 (noting that in the past, Congress has waited
“for the Supreme Court to clearly define the scope of Fourth Amendment protection for new
technologies before taking any legislative action”).
206. See Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, supra note 184, at 1529.
207. See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 195, at 596 (asserting that most scholarship on the
Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine takes as a given the courts’ role as arbiters in
“determining reasonable expectations of privacy in new technologies”).
208. Professor Orin Kerr teaches criminal law and criminal procedure at George
Washington University, where he has been a member of the faculty since 2001. GW Law
Faculty Directory: Orin S. Kerr, GEO. WASH. LAW SCH., http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/pro
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better because legislatures are not limited by the three significant
constraints courts face on a regular basis.
First, courts create rules “ex post in a case-by-case fashion,” meaning
that courts cannot apply the Fourth Amendment to new developments
in police tactics until cases involving those tactics come before them—
209
assuming the cases arise at all.
In contrast, “[l]egislatures can act at
any time,” even anticipating emerging investigative methods and
210
proscribing or limiting them in advance. Second, by the principle of
stare decisis, courts are bound to follow prior decisions, even if
211
outdated. Though it has the benefit of making judicial decisions more
predictable, stare decisis also gives the courts less flexibility; legislatures,
on the other hand, can take a more dynamic approach, designing laws to
212
meet the evolving needs of society. Finally, courts can generally only
consider the facts of a given case, but legislatures can act upon a “wide
range of inputs, ranging from legislative hearings and poll results to
213
interest group advocacy,” resulting in more informed legislation.
Given these factors, legislation seems more likely to offer better
protections and the possibility of redress to the subjects of unwarranted
police surveillance than any attempt to challenge the practices under the
Fourth Amendment.
B. Any Legislation that Protects Individuals from Police Surveillance
Must Sufficiently Address the Interests at Stake
Any

legislation

limiting

police

intelligence-gathering

and

file.aspx?id=3568 (last visited Sep. 16, 2012) (click on curriculum vitae link for a list of classes
taught). The author of several criminal law casebooks, he has been cited in at least one
decision by every regional United States Court of Appeals and by one account is the seventhmost cited criminal law scholar. Id.
209. Kerr, supra note 193, at 868–69 (detailing the numerous procedural obstacles that a
constitutionally questionable police tactic must overcome before a court may decide its
legality—even at the lowest levels of our judicial system).
210. Id. at 870.
211. See Richard J. Dougherty, Originalism and Precedent: Principles and Practices in
the Application of Stare Decisis, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 155, 157–58 (2007).
212. Kerr, supra note 193, at 871; see also Tokson, supra note 195, at 595–96 (arguing
that the “potential error costs of legislation may be lower than those of constitutional decision
making. Flawed statutes are relatively easy to amend, while erroneous Fourth Amendment
decisions could require a constitutional amendment to overturn”).
213. Kerr, supra note 193, at 875. For an argument that the judiciary holds some
advantages over the legislature, see id. at 882 (acknowledging that the judiciary’s
independence can sometimes be an asset, especially when legislation is the product of
disproportionately well-funded special-interest groups).
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surveillance activities must sufficiently take into account the two
competing sets of interests driving the debate—individuals’ privacy
interests and society’s collective interest in national security. These
interests are intensely held by wide swaths of the public, and, for many
individuals, these interests’ importance vis-à-vis each other are likely to
change over time in response to current events. The purpose of this
section is to define these interests more clearly, in the belief that any
legislation that does not take these interests into account will be
ineffective or, worse, unlikely to pass at all.
1. Privacy
The general consensus among privacy scholars is that privacy is, as
214
Hemingway might have put it, a fine thing and worth fighting for.
Most discussions of the concept begin by asserting, for example, that
215
privacy is a “self-evident good” consistent with the “aims of a free and
216
open society.”
A number of these discussions have identified
217
protected privacy rights throughout history, while others rely on the
thorough discussions of privacy rights as natural rights conducted by the
218
great philosophers of the Enlightenment. But so often these tributes
to the greatness of privacy fail to consider why—or even whether—
privacy is something worth protecting with the force of law. Even The
219
Right to Privacy, the famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis—widely regarded as the first piece
of American legal scholarship to advocate for a right to privacy in a civil

214. See ERNEST HEMINGWAY, FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS 502 (1940) (“The world
is a fine place and worth the fighting for and I hate very much to leave it.”).
215. David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, Inviolate Personality and the Literary Roots of the
Right to Privacy, 23 L. & LITERATURE 1, 2 (2011).
216. United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 165 (1984)).
217. See, e.g., Jeremy Osborne, Ascending the Slippery Slope: New Alabama Law
Enforcement Procedures Fail to Adequately Protect Sexual Assault Victims’ Privacy, 5 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 785, 787–88 (2007) (identifying privacy rights in the Hebrew Torah and in
ancient Greece).
218. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring
“Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L.
289, 320 (2011) (discussing the beliefs of the seventeenth-century-English philosopher John
Locke, who argued that individual autonomy and private property were inalienable natural
rights). In drafting the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the Founding
Fathers drew heavily on Enlightenment philosophers. Id. at 321.
219. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890) (recommending the creation of a new tort to protect individual privacy).
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law context—has since been criticized as too vague in describing its
220
conception of privacy.
The result is that the notion of “privacy” has come to be a powerful
but oftentimes meaningless incantation, invoked reflexively in a wide
array of contexts without much more than lip service as to its actual
221
importance.
Although privacy may have longstanding traditions in
both history and natural law, such justifications can appear especially
bland or ill-defined when stacked against more timely and more
222
concrete interests like national security.
In light of this, it is worth
discussing why individuals’ privacy interests are worth protecting in the
face of police intelligence-gathering activities—such as widespread
visual surveillance, the use of informants, and data-mining—all of which
significantly reduce the amount of privacy available to individuals as a
practical matter.
Scholars have identified two main effects that a reduction in privacy
will have on individuals and, in the aggregate, on society as a whole.
The first category contains psychological effects, which have been
thoroughly studied by experts. “Failure to be able to achieve privacy,”
such as would occur under conditions of near-constant surveillance, can
have “devastating psychological effects, such as deindividualization and
223
dehumanization.”
At a basic level, individuals subject to such
224
surveillance will begin to lose the “freedom of thought and mind.” In
225
One wellmore extreme cases antisocial behavior will likely result.
documented example of this—which also provides a better glimpse at
the concept of total surveillance than we might like to admit—occurs

220. See Rosen & Santesso, supra note 215, at 4–6 (summarizing the various criticisms of
The Right to Privacy, and asserting that “even critics sympathetic to the conclusions Warren
and Brandeis offer . . . have experienced difficulties perceiving the paper’s reasoning”).
221. See Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 479–80 (noting that “‘[p]rivacy is a
chameleon-like word,” used in “knee-jerk” fashion to “appeal to people’s fears and anxieties”
(quoting Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 458
(1995))).
222. See id. at 480 (discussing the imbalance between vague discussions of privacy
interests and opposing interests that are “much more readily articulated”).
223. Fradella et al., supra note 218, at 304.
224. See Anuj C. Desai, Can the President Read Your Mail? A Legal Analysis, 59 CATH.
U. L. REV. 315, 344 (2010) (arguing that certain privacy protections further the values of
“freedom of thought and mind”).
225. Fradella et al., supra note 218, at 304 (citing Darhl M. Pedersen, Psychological
Functions of Privacy, 17 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 147, 147 (1997)).
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with Hollywood celebrities, who sometimes suffer emotional
226
breakdowns because they cannot escape the paparazzi. Based on the
descriptions of police intelligence-gathering operations reported in the
media, it does not take a significant conceptual leap to imagine that
those subject to such surveillance might quickly come to feel the same
intense lack of privacy and the “extremely uncomfortable”
227
psychological effects that go with it.
The second category of side effects caused by a lack of privacy
includes behavioral effects, which can have a wide range of implications.
When individuals become aware of near-constant surveillance, they
228
begin to self-censor their normal behavioral patterns.
This, in turn,
enhances “the power of social norms,” as most self-censorship will
involve individuals seeking to conform to mainstream societal
229
boundaries. The result is a chilling effect on “eccentric individuality,”
not only in fact, but also in our innate desire to realize such
230
individuality.
While under some circumstances this might be
considered a positive aspect of certain narrowly defined police activities
231
intelligence-gathering
that deprive individuals of their privacy,
programs like those described here are hardly “narrowly defined,” and
are much more likely to affect individuals who have only a tenuous
connection to the target of the surveillance.
Some will argue that secret police intelligence gathering will not
have these effects, or at the very least, its effects will be minimized
because much of this surveillance is secret and the targets are unaware
of its existence. This is not likely true. Police intelligence programs
232
have, by now, been widely reported in the news media, and once the
public has gained a general awareness of the possibility of surveillance
through such programs, the mere fact of its existence can exert the same

226. Id. It is worth noting that lack of privacy can occur not only through surveillance
but also through the “public disclosure of highly personal information.” Id.
227. Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 493.
228. Id.
229. See id. (noting that “surveillance is a tool of social control, enhancing the power of
social norms, which work more effectively when people are being observed by others in the
community”).
230. Id. at 494 (quoting Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000)).
231. See id. (acknowledging that surveillance can be a valuable social control when it
comes to deterring crime).
232. See supra Part II.B.
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psychological and behavioral effects on individuals.
Enacting legislation that effectively limits police intelligence
gathering and protects individuals’ privacy interests thus has several
important functions. First, it would restore the public’s psychological
confidence in its own privacy, assuring individuals that they need not
fear imagined possibilities in a constant state of paranoia. Second, it
would provide significant societal benefits, limiting the possibility for
antisocial behavior that comes with reduced privacy. Finally, it would
eliminate or reduce the need for self-censorship, at least in certain
circumstances, encouraging the diversity of thought, opinion, and
behavior that is characteristic of liberal democracies. All noble goals—
but this is only half the story. This Part next considers the opposing
interest, national security.
2. National Security
As with privacy, assessing the importance of national security as an
interest to be protected is not a standalone inquiry; defending the
country from terrorist attacks and other foreign threats is a legitimate
234
and important purpose of the state. The inquiry here is why and when
such an interest should be elevated above constitutionally protected civil
liberties like privacy. It is critical such circumstances are taken into
account with respect to any proposed legislation that would limit police
surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices, because “no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
235
Nation.” The government must be able to provide this security when

233. Professor Daniel Solove of George Washington University Law School discusses
this concept within the context of the Panopticon, a theoretical prison designed by the
eighteenth-and nineteenth-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham:
The prison was set up with the inmates’ cells arrayed around a central observation
tower. Most importantly, the guards could see each prisoner from the tower, but the
prisoners could not see the guards from their cells. . . . The prisoner’s “only rational
option” was to conform with the prison’s rules because, at any moment, it was
possible that they were being watched. Thus, awareness of the possibility of
surveillance can be just as inhibitory as actual surveillance.
Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 192, at 495 (footnotes omitted) (citing DAVID LYON, THE
ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62–67 (1994)).
234. David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of
Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 631 (1983).
235. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981), quoted in Frederic Block, Civil Liberties
During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between the Three Branches of Government in
Coping with Past and Current Threats to the Nation’s Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
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we need it the most.
As a matter of importance, national security has a long history; by
some accounts, American national security predates even America
236
itself. The challenge of preserving that security through more than 235
years of wars, emergencies, economic shocks, and other exigent
circumstances, both real and imagined, has produced a number of
episodes in which the country has put its security before its civil
liberties. In 1798, Congress passed the Alien Act, which gave the
President the authority to summarily order the removal of foreign
237
nationals, and the Sedition Act, which prohibited the publication of
238
materials criticizing the government; both laws were passed in
response to rising diplomatic tensions with France that had potential
239
implications on domestic politics.
President Abraham Lincoln
240
famously suspended habeas corpus rights during the Civil War.
During World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which
criminalized the “mak[ing] or convey[ance] . . . [of] false statements with
intent to interfere with the success of the military . . . when the United
241
States is at war,” and during World War II, President Franklin
Roosevelt authorized the internment of Japanese-Americans living on
242
the West Coast. Based on this long history, it took no great amount of
prescience for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to assert, at a speech in
New York City less than three weeks after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, that Americans were now “likely to experience more
restrictions on personal freedom than has ever been the case in our
243
country.”
Indeed, civil liberties have once again come under fire in
CHANGE 459, 459 (2005).
236. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (tracing the origins of national security law to the
Committee for Secret Correspondence, which was created by the Continental Congress in
1775).
237. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798).
238. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (1798).
239. Banks & Bowman, supra note 236, at 16–17 & n.101 (discussing the circumstances
leading to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts).
240. Id. at 17. The suspension of these rights led to the military detention of more than
20,000 individuals suspected of “disloyalty.” Block, supra note 235, at 482–83.
241. Espionage Act of 1917, 65 Pub. L. 24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917) (codified as
amended at chapter 37, 18 U.S.C. (2000)); see Block, supra note 235, at 483.
242. See Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 175, 178 (2003).
243. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Supreme Court of the United States, Address at the
New York University School of Law Groundbreaking Ceremony (Sept. 28, 2001), quoted in
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244

the years following the attacks.
Historically, there have been at least four different arguments used
to justify elevating national security above civil liberties, and
understanding these reasons is critical for evaluating the relative
importance of the interest as a whole. The first argument is that
245
terrorists care little for our civil liberties; as a result, neither should we,
because doing so would put us at a dangerous competitive
246
disadvantage.
A closely considered formulation of this argument is
that our margin for error when dealing with our enemies—especially
terrorists—is so small, or even nonexistent, that we need to be able to
247
act without worrying about civil liberties protections. One’s response
to this argument is likely colored by policy preferences—How much
should we be willing to bend the rules in response to an extremist
threat?—but giving up on civil liberties entirely seems somewhat
defeatist. Ample scholarship, as well as common sense, suggests that a
balance can be struck that preserves individual liberties and privacy
248
while allowing us to counter serious threats to our security.
The second argument, which has come into vogue in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, is that our conflicts now
Block, supra note 235, at 459.
244. See, e.g., Richard Schmitt, Covert Searches Are Increasing Under Patriot Act, L.A.
TIMES, May 2, 2004, at A29 (describing civil liberties advocates’ concerns over the number of
“secret searches” conducted by the Justice Department in the years following the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
245. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of
Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34 (1983) (noting that the need for
police to “respond in kind” to their enemies “has long been a traditional justification” for
making greater use of technology in surveillance).
246. See Lisa M. Kaas, Note, Liberty v. Safety: Internet Privacy After September 11, 1
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 175, 188 (2002) (recalling that Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act in response to law enforcement’s pleas that they needed to be “equipped with
the most up-to-date tools in order to combat an increasingly high-tech enemy”); see also
Goldsmith, supra note 245.
247. See Eggert, supra note 234, at 634 (noting that the Justice Department has argued
that “foreign affairs often require prompt and decisive action”); see also John Mintz &
Michael Grunwald, FBI Terror Probes Focus on U.S. Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1998, at
A1, A8 (quoting a frustrated senior FBI official as saying, “We know that whenever we do
something, people are going to call us jackbooted thugs. But if we do nothing, people are
going to yell at us when something blows up”), quoted in Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the
Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional
Law, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2000).
248. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 242, at 177–78 (arguing that “it is possible for national
security legislation to protect civil liberties, while achieving national security objectives,” and
that national security and civil liberties are “not mutually exclusive”).
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involve stateless enemies for which there is no effective military
249
response; thus, curtailing civil liberties in certain limited circumstances
250
The operative word in this
may be the best or only alternative.
argument is “limited.” Americans may be willing to recognize limited
curtailment of civil liberties in times of emergency, or may be more
251
willing to do so if the curtailment is well-defined.
Prospective
legislation must take this into account.
The third argument is that national security is a precondition of civil
252
liberties. In other words, civil liberties cannot exist without the nation,
and if the nation is threatened, then we must turn our resources toward
first protecting the nation; only once the nation is secure can we again
253
worry about the freedoms that we hold dear.
Although there is an
attractive simplicity to this argument, it is important to note that it
hinges on the assumption that the nation faces a dire threat to its
existence. Few Americans are in a position to accurately assess such an
assumption, which means that, if the government is authorized to take
national security measures that endanger civil liberties, the chance of
effective oversight may be slight. Any potential legislation must also
address this.
The final argument in favor of elevating national security concerns
above civil liberties is a procedural one—that there is precedent to
support it.
In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence

249. See Sievert, supra note 247, at 1427
250. See id. at 1427–28 (identifying the “many practical problems associated with the use
of military force” against terrorists, such as that they have no easily identifiable “home base”
and that their foreign hosts may not be aware of their presence); John C. Yoo, Judicial
Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429 (2003) (noting that the
war on terror is “unconventional” and the enemy “does not seek to defend or acquire any
specific territory,” compelling the U.S. government to “undertake a full spectrum of domestic
and international responses”).
251. See Emanuel Gross, How to Justify an Emergency Regime and Preserve Civil
Liberties in Times of Terrorism, 5 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 22 (2008) (explaining that in the
face of terrorism related states of emergency, “the public might urge the government to
change the traditional array of constitutional balances between civil liberties and national
security in favor of the latter”).
252. See Davis, supra note 242, at 238.
253. See id. (asserting that “it becomes very difficult to preserve civil liberties if the
survival of the nation is in the balance” and that “by preserving the nation we are better able
to preserve freedom”); Kaas, supra note 246, at 189 (noting that “the liberties held so dear by
so many Americans are made possible in the first place by a government that protects and
defends its people against the acts of oppressive regimes”).
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254

Surveillance Act (FISA),
which generally provides the federal
government with the ability to conduct electronic surveillance without a
warrant as long as the Attorney General certifies to a special Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is no “substantial likelihood”
255
that U.S. persons will be a party to the surveillance.
Despite that
FISA “has been criticized for lacking ‘due process and
256
accountability,’” and that its quasi-constitutional structure is not
257
entirely compatible with the Fourth Amendment,
the law has
“withstood substantial judicial scrutiny”—apparent evidence that, when
it comes to intelligence gathering, civil liberties should take a back seat
258
to national security.
But the type of surveillance with which FISA is concerned is an
inexact parallel to current police intelligence activities for two reasons.
First, and most importantly, the law’s scope is limited to foreign
nationals; if nothing else, Congress sought to avoid compromising
Americans’ civil liberties in passing the law. Second, FISA provides a
complex set of controls to guard against abuses of surveillance: for
example, surveillance applications submitted to the FISA court must be
particular in describing the target of the surveillance, and must also
describe “minimization procedures” that have been put in place to
259
ensure that Americans do not become subject to such surveillance. It
is hardly accurate to characterize FISA as a wholesale suspension of
civil liberties, especially with respect to Americans, and it is equally
inaccurate to claim that there is legal precedent that supports unlimited
police surveillance. Nevertheless, like the other arguments discussed
here, its presence in the scholarship illustrates just how compelling an
interest national security is—and one that must be considered in
drafting any legislation that would limit police surveillance.

254. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 112 Stat. 2436
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
255. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (2006).
256. Davis, supra note 242, at 190 (quoting Gerald H. Robinson, We’re Listening!
Electronic Eavesdropping, FISA, and the Secret Court, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 51, 72
(2000)).
257. See id. at 196 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s “criminal standard of probable
cause” and FISA’s “foreign intelligence standard” of probable cause are “very different”).
258. See id. at 204 (noting that FISA has withstood “substantial judicial scrutiny”).
259. See id. at 192–93 (describing the requirements of FISA court surveillance
applications).
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V. A WAY FORWARD—THE MARYLAND MODEL
Even if one understands the case behind each of the interests that
will be implicated in a statute limiting police surveillance and
intelligence gathering, crafting a statute that satisfies both will be no
easy task. Drawing on prior experience may help. This Part suggests
one possible model by looking at the legislative response to a past
example of police surveillance that occurred in a non-terrorism-related
context. The statute discussed in this Part offers both a good starting
point for limiting widespread police surveillance, and also some room
for improvement to ensure it protects individuals from the much more
amorphous intelligence gathering that has occurred in the
counterterrorism context.
A. Background
In 2004, as the State of Maryland prepared to execute three
260
prisoners over the next three years, a fierce debate arose in the public
261
In February 2005,
sphere over capital punishment in the state.
following the execution of the first of those three prisoners,
262
commanders at the Maryland State Police (MSP) began to worry
about anti-death penalty activists protesting the two remaining
executions and asked for a “threat assessment” from MSP’s Homeland

260. The three prisoners were Steven Oken, who was executed in 2004; Wesley Baker,
executed in 2005; and Vernon Lee Evans, whose execution was stayed in 2006. Jennifer
McMenamin, Evans’ Death Sentence on Hold, BALT. SUN, Feb. 7, 2006, at 1A; Lisa Rein,
Anticipated Death Penalty Protests Prompted Spying, WASH. POST, July 26, 2008, at B1;
Capital Punishment History: Persons Executed in Maryland Since 1923, MD. DEP’T PUB.
SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/capitalpunish
ment/demographics_persons1923.shtml (last visited August 26, 2011) [hereinafter Capital
Punishment in Maryland]. The executions of Baker and Oken were only the fourth and fifth
executions in the state since 1961. Id. In 2009, Maryland tightened its death-penalty rules to
limit its use to cases in which there is “DNA or other biological evidence, a videotaped
confession or a video recording of the crime.” Andrea F. Siegel, Md. Death Penalty Trial
Delayed, BALT. SUN, July 24, 2010, at A6. As of 2011, Baker is the last prisoner to have been
executed in Maryland. Capital Punishment in Maryland, supra.
261. Rein, supra note 260. The 2002 election of Governor Robert Ehrlich, a deathpenalty supporter, may have added fuel to the fire of the debate. See id.; see also Former
Governors: Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., MD. MANUAL ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO MD. GOV’T
(March 7, 2012), http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/08conoff/former/html/msa12125.htm
l [hereinafter Former Governors].
262. In 2010, the Maryland State Police had 1,439 sworn personnel. MD. DEP’T OF
STATE POLICE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2010).
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263

Security and Intelligence Division. After determining that there was a
264
“‘potential for disruption’ at both executions,” the Division assigned
four troopers to work undercover and infiltrate anti-death penalty
activist groups for the purpose of gathering information about the
265
groups’ future activities, such as protests and rallies.
266
The undercover troopers’ mission began in March 2005 and
267
continued for the next fourteen months.
The troopers infiltrated
protest groups, befriended activists, joined mailing lists, and inquired
268
At some point
about protesting tactics, including civil disobedience.
during the investigation, the MSP’s net also widened to include not just
anti-death penalty activists, but also activists protesting the Iraq War,
animal-rights advocates, consumers protesting increases in electricity
rates, environmentalists, and even a group committed to establishing
269
more bicycle lanes in cities.
In total, during the fourteen-month
investigation, the MSP collected information and maintained secret files
on fifty-three individuals connected with the various activist groups
270
under surveillance.
Despite launching an operation of such considerable length and

263. Lisa Rein & Josh White, More Groups Than Thought Monitored in Police Spying,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2009, at A1; STEPHEN H. SACHS, REVIEW OF MARYLAND STATE
POLICE COVERT SURVEILLANCE OF ANTI-DEATH PENALTY AND ANTI-WAR GROUPS
FROM MARCH 2005 TO MAY 2006, at 32 (2008), available at http://www.governor.maryland.g
ov/documents/SachsReport.pdf.
264. Rein & White, supra note 263.
265. SACHS, supra note 263, at 2, 13, 15 & n.10; Gadi Dechter, Surveillance Was
‘Misguided,’ BALT. SUN, Oct. 2, 2008, at 1.
266. SACHS, supra note 263, at 13.
267. Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at 1A. During the
fourteen-month investigation, the troopers conducted a total of 288 hours of investigation.
Id.
268. See SACHS, supra note 263, at 35–37; Bob Drogin, Spying on Pacifists, Greens and
Nuns, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A18. In terms of infiltration, these methods were
unquestionably successful. By the time the investigation came to an end in May 2006, see
SACHS, supra note 263, at 1, one of the troopers had attended twenty-nine different meetings,
an average of two per month. Drogin, supra.
269. Rein & White, supra note 263. Although far from an accurate measure, it is worth
noting that, by 2008, more than thirty activist groups had filed freedom-of-information
requests with the MSP to determine whether they were among the groups that the
undercover troopers had infiltrated. Dechter, supra note 265. The expanded scope was
possible—and perhaps encouraged—because many of the activists’ causes overlapped. Rein
& White, supra note 263.
270. Laura Smitherman, Ex-Police Chief Defends Spying, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 2008, at
3A.
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breadth, the MSP put few controls in place to ensure the operation
abided by constitutional protections of civil liberties. Not surprisingly,
271
the investigation soon “spiraled out of control.” Although the activist
groups under surveillance were “committed to lawful, peaceful
272
protest,” and there was no evidence of “criminal activity or intent on
273
the undercover trooper frequently
the part of the protesters,”
274
requested the case remain open and that surveillance continue. MSP
commanders rarely, if ever, questioned these requests, and may have
even granted such requests for reasons that had nothing to do with the
275
original impetus for the investigation. Nor did MSP commanders take
any action to stop the surveillance from expanding beyond the anti276
death-penalty groups that were the original targets of the operation,
even though they were reading the field reports from the undercover
277
officers on a daily or near-daily basis. The MSP also had few controls
in place for handling the information it received from the
278
investigations.

271. Rein & White, supra note 263.
272. SACHS, supra note 263, at 29–31.
273. Madigan, supra note 267.
274. Rein & White, supra note 263.
275. SACHS, supra note 263, at 41. By some accounts, commanders may have seen
ongoing surveillance as a chance to give inexperienced troopers a chance at undercover work.
Id. at 42. Alternatively, the MSP may have seen the program as a chance to breathe new life
into the MSP’s Homeland Security and Intelligence Division. See Rein & White, supra note
263. In 2004, the division’s headcount had been “whittled” from about sixty-five officers
down to twelve; the downsizing came after the police superintendent who had built up the
division following the September 11 terrorist attacks was forced out because of corruption
charges. To those within the unit, the surveillance mission must have appeared as a chance to
do serious police work and prove their worth. Id.; see also Madigan, supra note 267
(reporting an activist’s theory that investigations such as the MSP surveillance program
helped local law enforcement agencies obtain funding from the federal government).
276. See SACHS, supra note 263, at 38 (describing how, in interviews after the fact, “MSP
commanders . . . could neither recall any contemporaneous discussions about the decision to
expand the investigation to include anti-war groups and pacifists, nor could they articulate a
sound law enforcement or public safety basis for doing so”).
277. Id. at 41.
278. The fifty-three individuals on whom the MSP maintained files were labeled as
“terrorists” in the MSP’s database, Rein & White, supra note 263, even though some of those
individuals included two Catholic nuns, a congressional candidate, and a man who
campaigned against military recruiting at high schools. Lisa Rein, Spying on Activists
Discussed at Forum, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2008, at C3. One of the individuals in the MSP’s
files had never been to Maryland, while others had been there but were not present in the
state when the spying took place. Id. Despite a lack of evidence of criminal activity,
however, the MSP took no action to remove the information from the database; instead, the
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The investigation and the surveillance became public in July 2008
279
during a separate trespassing trial involving several of the activists, and
280
the demand for a public accounting was almost immediate. Although
the MSP asserted that the surveillance was not unlawful, and that the
281
agency did not “inappropriately curtail” the activists’ civil liberties,
282
Within a day, Governor Martin
such justifications were short-lived.
O’Malley vowed to put an end to any police spying conducted without
283
evidence of wrongdoing,
and later appointed the former state
Attorney General Stephen Sachs to lead an independent review of the
284
MSP’s surveillance program.
Conducted over a two-month period in 2008, Sachs’s review was
285
thorough—and damning.
Following interviews with all of the major
286
players involved, the review concluded that (1) the surveillance
program “intruded upon the ability of law-abiding Marylanders to
associate and express themselves freely;” (2) the MSP violated federal
law by sharing its intelligence with other law enforcement agencies; and
(3) the “MSP showed a lack of judgment” by describing peaceful
287
The review also
activists as terrorists in various police databases.
information was shared with federal authorities and at least seven different local law
enforcement agencies. Rein & White, supra note 263.
279. Rein & White, supra note 263. The program became public because of documents
that were discovered during a trespassing trial for several activists in 2008. See id.
Subsequent freedom-of-information requests and additional lawsuits compelled the MSP to
release additional documents pertaining to the program. Id.
280. Jonathan Bor & Gus G. Sentementes, State Police Spying Decried, BALT. SUN, July
19, 2008, at 1A.
281. Madigan, supra note 267.
282. The surveillance program had been conducted under the administration of
Governor Robert Ehrlich, a Republican who was in office from 2003 to 2007. Former
Governors, supra note 261. By the time it became public knowledge, Maryland voters had
replaced Ehrlich with Governor Martin O’Malley, a Democrat. See Governor: Martin J.
O’Malley, MD. MANUAL ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO MD. GOV’T (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/mdmanual/08conoff/html/msa13090.html.
If nothing else,
O’Malley could easily afford to distance himself from the events of a predecessor’s
administration because his predecessor came from the opposing political party.
283. Bor & Sentementes, supra note 280.
284. Laura Smitherman, Review of State Police Is Ordered, BALT. SUN, Aug. 1, 2008,
at 1A.
285. See SACHS, supra note 263; Smitherman, supra note 284. Sachs was appointed by
Governor O’Malley to lead the review on July 31, 2008, and submitted his final report on
Sept. 29, 2008. SACHS, supra note 263, at 1, 13.
286. Sachs interviewed MSP commanders, the troopers who conducted the surveillance,
and the activists whose organizations were infiltrated. SACHS, supra note 263, at 14–15.
287. Id. at 3, 6–7.
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recommended several corrective actions to the MSP, including adopting
regulations to more tightly control surveillance and notifying individuals
288
who were wrongly labeled terrorists in police databases.
The MSP
subsequently announced it would adopt all of the report’s
289
recommendations.
The public, however, demanded its own protections, and in 2009, the
Maryland General Assembly passed and Governor O’Malley signed
into law the Freedom of Association and Assembly Protection Act of
290
291
2009.
The law, as well as the regulations adopted pursuant to it,
provide for greater controls over police surveillance and intelligencegathering activities, while still offering police enough leeway to conduct
legitimate investigations if the need arises. This is a useful model that
other jurisdictions might adopt. The rest of this Part will discuss the
law’s features and offer some modest recommendations for
improvements upon the law.
B. The Law
The Freedom of Association and Assembly Protection Act contains
several specific limitations on police conduct that serve to protect
individuals’ civil liberties. To start, the law’s key provision prohibits
officers from conducting a “covert investigation” of individuals involved
in “First Amendment activities” unless the top official at the agency—
for example, the chief of police—finds both (1) a “reasonable,
articulable suspicion” that the person is engaged in criminal activity and
292
(2) that a less intrusive method of investigation will not suffice. Within
the context of the law, a covert investigation involves attempted or
actual infiltration of an organization in which the law enforcement
293
agency or officer’s identity is concealed,
although the use of
plainclothes officers for security purposes at public events is exempt
294
from this definition.
First Amendment activities include both
constitutionally protected speech as well as conduct related to certain

288. Id. at 8–10.
289. Dechter, supra note 265.
290. 2009 Md. Laws 2713 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701
(LexisNexis 2011)).
291. MD. CODE REGS. 29.08.01.04 (2011); 37 Md. Reg. 432 (Feb. 26, 2010).
292. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
293. Id. § 3-701(a)(3)(i).
294. Id. § 3-701(a)(3)(ii).
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First Amendment rights such as “free exercise of religion, freedom of
the press, the right to assemble, or the right to petition the
295
government.”
In addition to the primary limitation described above, the law also
restricts police conduct in other ways, several of which are directly
applicable to the widespread intelligence-gathering operations
established by police after September 11, 2001. First, any investigations
involving First Amendment activities must be conducted for a
“legitimate law enforcement objective,” and in the process of
conducting such investigations, police must take measures to “safeguard
296
the constitutional rights and liberties of all persons.”
Once all leads
have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement purpose
297
remains, the investigation must be terminated. Police may not collect
information solely about a person’s “political beliefs, ideologies, and
associations” unless it is either relevant to a criminal investigation or
298
there is a reasonable suspicion of certain criminal activities. Finally,
any information obtained in violation of the law may not knowingly be
299
Notably, the law also requires
included in police intelligence files.
local law enforcement agencies in Maryland to have adopted publicly
available policies governing their officers’ conduct in investigations
involving First Amendment activities and their recordkeeping practices
300
for information obtained from such investigations.
Typically, such a

295. Id. § 3-701(a)(5); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
296. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(d)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2011). Legitimate
law enforcement objectives are only those involving the “detection, investigation, deterrence,
or prevention of crime, or the apprehension and prosecution of a suspected criminal.” Id. § 3701(a)(7).
297. Id. § 3-701(f).
298. Id. § 3-701(g); see also id. § 3-701(g)(2) (listing the crimes for which a “reasonable
articulable suspicion” allows the police to collect such information).
299. Id. § 3-701(k). It is worth emphasizing a law enforcement agency must have
knowledge that the information they are placing in a criminal intelligence file was obtained in
violation of the law, id., which appears to allow for the negligent inclusion of intelligence
obtained in violation of the law. But the statute that governs the act of collecting intelligence,
id. § 3-701(g), contains no such qualifying language, suggesting that in a case of negligent
inclusion, a plaintiff could still hold law enforcement liable for collecting the information in
the first place.
300. Id. § 3-701(m).
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301

policy simply incorporates portions of the law almost verbatim.
302
As required by the law, the MSP adopted regulations for its
practices involving the conduct covered by the law; although these
regulations apply only to the MSP, they are useful because they provide
additional detail on how a local law enforcement agency is
implementing the law. For the most part, the regulations mirror the law,
but they expand upon it in certain key respects. For example, whenever
a regulated investigation is in progress, officers are required to submit—
and commanders are required to review—ongoing reports about the
303
investigations within tightly limited time frames; the purpose of such
reports is to provide commanders with a regular opportunity to
304
terminate the investigation if it risks violating the law. Additionally,
the MSP must purge criminal intelligence files that no longer have any
informational value, and it must annually audit its files to determine
305
whether any of them meet this criteria.
Finally, the regulations also
contain an important limitation that prevents police from circumventing
the regulations by using third parties, such as informants, to obtain
306
regulated information on their behalf.
Because the law has only been in effect since 2009, and the MSP
regulations since 2010, it may be too soon to determine whether the law
is having its intended effect. Early indications are that it may have been
successful; on its website, the American Civil Liberties Union does not
list any examples of police spying in Maryland following the MSP
307
incident described in Part V.A. Nevertheless, there are additional civil
301. See, e.g., General Orders, Ronald A. Ricucci, Chief of Police, Takoma Park Police
Dep’t, No. 631A on Covert Investigations (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://www.takomapark
md.gov/police/documents/covertinvestigations.pdf. For an example of verbatim text sections,
see the identical definition of “covert investigation” in the Takoma Park Police Department
General Orders and the Maryland Code. Compare id. at 103A, with MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 3–701(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).
302. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(b)(l) (LexisNexis 2011).
303. MD. CODE REGS. 29.08.01.04A(4) (2011) (noting that under this regulation, a
report must be submitted by a covert officer within two working days after each contact with
the target of the investigation, and such reports must be reviewed by commanders within five
working days after the report’s submission).
304. Id. at 29.08.01.04A(4)(d)–(e).
305. Id. at 29.08.01.04B(8)(d), .04B(9).
306. Id. at 29.08.01.05B(2).
307. Spying on First Amendment Activity—State-by-State, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
http://www.aclu.org/maps/spying-first-amendment-activity-state-state (click on Maryland for
detail) (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). On the other hand, it may just be that the MSP has gotten
better at conducting its covert investigations.
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liberties protections that could be incorporated into the law, which are
outlined in the next section of this Part.
C. Recommendations for Improvements to the Law
308

No law is perfect.
The Freedom of Association and Assembly
Protection Act is the product of the inevitable compromises that are
necessary when crafting legislation that walks the fine line between two
intensely held interests like protecting civil liberties and securing public
safety. Generally, the Act strikes a fair balance between protecting civil
liberties (by giving individuals protection against certain types of police
conduct) and preserving the ability of police to defend the nation’s
security (by limiting its civil liberties protections to certain, more
309
sensitive contexts like “First Amendment activities”). But as a model
statute for other jurisdictions, it would benefit from a handful of
amendments that would strengthen its protections without unduly
burdening law enforcement.
There are at least six different changes that should be made to the
law. The first three changes arise from both what we know about the
310
nature of widespread police surveillance and intelligence gathering,
and what we know about the nature of covert investigative power—
311
namely, that it has historically been prone to abuse: Lawmakers
should (1) expand the list of activities that trigger the statute’s
protections; (2) require court approval for any request to circumvent the
law; and (3) entrust responsibility for oversight to a third party outside
the division conducting the investigations at issue (and preferably
outside the law enforcement agency altogether). The other three
changes recommend themselves from the FISA, which, though it has
312
weathered its share of due-process criticism, nevertheless contains
some basic procedural elements that could benefit the Maryland law as
308. Davis, supra note 242, at 178.
309. See supra Part V.B.
310. See supra Part II.B.
311. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Unlimited Power: Why the President’s (Warrantless)
Surveillance Program Is Unconstitutional, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 647, 672 (2010) (“One
of the fundamental lessons this nation learned is that all power, including investigative
powers, is easily abused . . . .”); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me
Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That
Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 185 (2012) (“Covert surveillance
methods are investigative tools that by their very nature invade the privacy of those targeted
and are, as history has shown, prone to abuse.”).
312. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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a model statute: Lawmakers should (4) strengthen the law’s
313
“minimization procedures” to ensure innocent parties’ privacy is
preserved; (5) require police to provide regular reports to the city
council or state legislature on both the volume and nature of
surveillance conducted under the law; and (6) require police to develop
training for officers to ensure they understand and will comply with the
law’s requirements. I will discuss these six recommendations in order.
First, lawmakers should expand the list of activities that trigger the
statute’s protection by broadening the definition of “covert
investigation.” The statute currently only includes investigations
314
involving actual or attempted police infiltration, which means that, in
its current form, the statute offers little protection against the extended
surveillance or data-mining that are characteristic of post-September 11
police intelligence operations, but which do not rely on infiltration.
These activities should be included within the law’s definition of covert
investigation.
Although law enforcement advocates will cry foul, there are three
considerations that should ease their concerns. First, the law only
applies to investigations involving First Amendment activities, which
means surveillance, data-mining, and other investigative tools discussed
315
in this Comment remain freely available in less sensitive contexts.
Second, the law arguably already prohibits the use of these tools in First
Amendment contexts because it also prohibits the maintenance of
criminal intelligence files containing information involving First
Amendment activities when that information has no application to a
316
current criminal investigation. Adding such activities to the definition
of covert investigation only serves to make the law more explicit, not
more burdensome. And, finally, when it comes to gray areas, the courts
317
are likely to give law enforcement the benefit of the doubt.

313. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006) (defining “minimization procedures” in the
context of FISA).
314. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).
315. Id. § 3-701(c)(1).
316. Id. § 3-701(g).
317. See Davis, supra note 242, at 178 (arguing that “laws will probably be interpreted to
support the government’s tendency toward self-preservation when a ‘threat to the nation’s
security is real’” (quoting David G. Savage, Historically, Laws Bend in Time of War,
Rehnquist Says, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at A22)); see also Harris, supra note 80, at 153
(“In today’s post-9/11 climate, it is hard to imagine a federal court issuing directives limiting
police use of surveillance activities . . . .”).
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The second change that should be made to strengthen the law is to
require judicial approval of any request to circumvent the law’s
protections, rather than the current requirement that such deviations be
authorized by the head of the law enforcement agency conducting the
318
investigation. At most, the agency head’s authorization should only be
effective in cases of exigent circumstances—and only then until proper
judicial authorization can reasonably be obtained. Although law
enforcement advocates may argue that this places an additional burden
on police, the fact is that requiring judicial approval does not change the
requirement that police justify their investigations with a “reasonable,
articulable suspicion” of criminal activity—it only changes the person to
whom such a justification is made. On the contrary, requiring judicial
approval to circumvent the law’s protections recognizes that, even when
acting in good faith, police have an inherently “stronger interest in
investigation” than in avoiding any collateral damage (such as to civil
319
liberties) resulting from those investigations. Positioning the courts as
a safeguard provides a counterweight to this interest.
The third change is to give responsibility for oversight to a third
party outside of the division of the law enforcement agency conducting
the investigation (and ideally out of the police department altogether),
because law enforcement agencies are not adept at self-regulation.
Normally, self-regulation within law enforcement is driven by public
320
dissatisfaction with police conduct, but in the case of terrorism
prevention, the public’s insistence that the government do all it can to
stop another terrorist attack from occurring may outweigh concerns
321
over civil liberties infringements.
Furthermore, past failures by law
enforcement to self-regulate may suggest many agencies lack the will to
322
self-regulate.
Additionally, even in those cases where law
318. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
319. See Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s “Wars”
on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1145, 1189 n.248 (2009).
320. See Evan N. Turgeon, National Security, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment: A
New Perspective on Hiibel, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 23, 49–50 (2008–2009).
321. Elected civic leaders typically must answer to dissatisfied voters at election time,
giving them an incentive to ensure that police keep their conduct in line. See id. at 50. But if
voters send a different message—stop terrorists at all costs, for example—it removes the
incentive for elected officials to exert pressure on police, and that protection is lost.
322. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 481–82 (2004) (“A pattern of continued wrongdoing that is known but
unaddressed . . . suggests that the organization has lost the will and/or the ability to police
itself.”).
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enforcement has self-regulated, these restrictions have often been rolled
323
back post-September 11.
Oversight is better addressed by a third party—either a kind of
ombudsman within the agency’s internal affairs division, or someone
within the local government outside of the police department—who can
bring local knowledge of law enforcement priorities as well as
independent perspective and judgment to the required review of
intelligence files. Law enforcement may balk at such restrictions, but in
addition to strengthening civil liberties, oversight may help police
become more efficient, in at least two different respects. On one hand,
oversight will give police an opportunity to better understand whether
324
particular investigative methods are working. On the other, oversight
will help avoid duplication of efforts and eliminate waste, an especially
valuable service for police departments that are stretched thin as they
325
try to meet substantial demands with scarce resources.
The fourth change to the law is to strengthen the law’s requirement
326
that police implement “minimization procedures” to ensure innocent
parties’ privacy is preserved. Although the law already requires that
police take measures to “safeguard the constitutional rights and liberties
327
of all persons,” in its current form it leaves this responsibility to police.
328
Because police may be unable or unwilling to self-regulate,
strengthening the minimization-procedures requirement is essential, and
can be accomplished in one of two ways: either the law could require
judicial approval of minimization procedures established as part of a
329
widespread surveillance operation, or the law could require that the
323. See Harris, supra note 80, at 151–52 (describing how restrictions on the use of
surveillance in Chicago and New York that were put in place in the 1980s have been rolled
back after September 11).
324. See Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2179, 2183 (2009) (arguing that there is a “natural role for oversight [of surveillance]
focused on efficacy. . . . If a surveillance tool or program doesn’t work, it shouldn’t be used.
This seems obvious, but tends to become lost in practice.”).
325. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1488–89 (2010–2011) (noting the
“size and redundancy of the U.S. anti-terror apparatus” and arguing that independent
oversight can address the “overall cost-effectiveness” of domestic intelligence spending).
326. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (defining “minimum procedures” in the context of FISA).
327. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-701(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2011).
328. See supra notes 321–22 and accompanying text.
329. This type of mechanism has been used in a number of federal laws related to
surveillance; in addition to FISA, the Wiretap Act, also requires judicial approval of
minimization procedures. Pell & Soghoian, supra note 311, at 184.
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relevant executive authorities draft rules in advance to specifically
330
define what minimization procedures are required.
Because
minimization procedures “can and should play a role in limiting the
privacy harms associated with” covert investigations, strong rules
331
governing such procedures are essential to the law’s effectiveness.
The fifth change lawmakers should make to the law is to require
police to regularly file publicly available summary reports on the nature
and volume of regulated investigations they have conducted. Such
reports could be modeled on those mandated by FISA, which requires
the Attorney General to report to Congress every six months on various
332
aspects of covert investigations. Ideally, these reports will provide the
public with the information they need to assess whether police conduct
333
conforms to the public’s expectations, while remaining nonspecific
enough to avoid compromising ongoing investigations. Any police
conduct that is uncovered through these reports but does not conform to
the public’s expectations can be averted through further legislative
amendments, mitigating long-term damage to Americans’ privacy
334
interests.
The sixth and final change to be made to the law involves requiring
police to develop training for officers to ensure they understand and will
comply with the law’s requirements. While this is perhaps the most
functional and least strategic of the proposals outlined here, it
330. As part of the USA PATRIOT Act, “Congress directed the [Department of
Justice] to adopt specific minimization procedures for records obtained pursuant to” certain
regulations related to national security. Id. at 184–85. Although some may argue this is still a
form of self-regulation, drafting the rules in advance may at least limit the most blatant cases
of manipulation.
331. See id. at 184.
332. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a) (2006). Among other data, the Attorney General must provide
Congress with a breakdown of the number of persons targeted by various types of
investigations, id. § 1871(a)(1), the number of times the Attorney General has authorized the
use of intelligence acquired under FISA in a criminal proceeding, id. § 1871(a)(3), and any
significant legal interpretations stemming from FISA-related court proceedings, id.
§ 1871(a)(4).
333. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 311, at 188–89 (detailing the public benefits of
reporting requirements in various federal laws related to surveillance, such as allowing the
media to report on the government’s increased use of wiretaps and scholars to study trends in
government surveillance practices).
334. See Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 303 (2009)
(asserting that “ex post oversight mechanisms” in FISA, as amended in the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881, “might mitigate the risk that innocent
Americans’ communications will be acquired and retained”).
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nevertheless serves an important role in making the law an effective
barrier to the abuse of widespread surveillance powers. Ideally,
legislatures and city councils would continue to reevaluate the law’s
335
provisions, but because this may not always be possible, the next-best
option may be police departments staffed by officers who are well
acquainted with the legislative intent, and the surveillance that is
336
permitted within the law’s boundaries. Additionally, similar to FISA,
the law might include provisions that restrict officers from participating
in regulated investigations until they have received the required
training, and that the effectiveness of training be evaluated by the head
337
of the department or a third-party ombudsman on a regular basis.
Taken together, these proposals should result in a model statute that
provides strong and durable oversight over widespread police
surveillance and intelligence gathering—at least in sensitive contexts
such as those regulated by the First Amendment—while still allowing
police the capability to preemptively track and disrupt potential terrorist
organizations. In the final section of this Part, this Comment will return
to the cases in Los Angeles and New York City, discussed earlier, to
assess whether the law might truly be effective.
D. Applying the Law—How Things Might Have Been Different
338

339

The cases in New York City and Los Angeles discussed in Part
II.B. provide typical examples of the type of widespread police
surveillance and intelligence gathering with which this Comment is
concerned. In closing, the final section of this Part will attempt to
340
illustrate how an amended version of the Maryland Freedom of
Association and Assembly Protection Act might have mitigated police
conduct and protected civil liberties in those cases (and others like
335. See Charles A. Shanor, Terrorism, Historical Analogies, and Modern Choices, 24
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 589, 606 (2010) (arguing that ongoing legislative rulemaking is the best
solution for intelligence oversight, in the long run superior to either judicial process or an
unregulated executive).
336. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 334, at 303 (highlighting the requirement imposed by the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)(1), that intelligence personnel be
trained in the implementation of FISA’s restrictions as an effective way to mitigate the risks
FISA poses to Americans’ civil liberties).
337. See Blum, supra note 334, at 303.
338. See supra Part II.B.2.
339. See supra Part II.B.1.
340. For the purposes of this section, I will assume the law has been amended and
strengthened in accordance with the proposals outlined in Part V.C.
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them), had the law been in place in each jurisdiction.
The most important protection that the law would have provided is
that widespread surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations, like
those conducted by the LAPD and NYPD, would have qualified under
the law as “covert investigations,” and thus become subject to the law’s
341
regulations.
As a result, the investigations could not have
proceeded—at least with respect to First Amendment activities such as
the free exercise of religion or peaceable assembly—without judicial
342
authorization. To obtain such an authorization, police would have had
to argue before a judge that there was both a “reasonable, articulable
suspicion” of criminal activity, and that no less intrusive investigative
343
method would satisfy police objectives.
All of these procedural
hurdles would have provided opportunities to stop, limit, or better
control the investigations.
Assuming, arguendo, that courts decided the LAPD and NYPD
intelligence-gathering operations satisfied this standard and allowed
police to continue, authorities would still have had to comply with the
law’s other oversight mechanisms. For example, police would have been
required to compile minimization plans to ensure that innocent
members of the public saw their privacy rights preserved, and such plans
would have either required judicial approval, or must have complied
344
with the guidelines established by authorities in advance.
Furthermore, police would either be prohibited from maintaining
intelligence files on information gathered through these investigations
(if the information was gathered in violation of the law), or police would
have been required to purge the information when regular audits
revealed that it no longer had any informational value to an ongoing
345
investigation.
In addition, police would have had to regularly file reports—either

341. See supra notes 314–17 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 292.
344. See supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text. Minimization procedures would
have been useful in both cases. The NYPD almost certainly gathered intelligence on innocent
individuals through undercover police reports on everyday activities at cafés, restaurants, and
other public locations. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. The LAPD’s current
suspicious-activity reporting program, which allows police to report their observations of
innocuous activity without any independent suspicion of wrongdoing, likely has the same
result. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text.
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to the city council, the state legislature, or some other independent
oversight commission, depending on how the law was drafted—on the
volume and type of surveillance they were conducting, which would
346
provide the public with additional opportunities for oversight. In cases
of widespread surveillance and intelligence gathering like those in New
York City and Los Angeles, this might have offered the public a glimpse
of both programs before they triggered public outrage, and given police
a chance to better consult with residents on how best to achieve their
347
objectives while respecting civil liberties.
Finally, with a law like the amended version of the Maryland
Freedom of Association and Assembly Protection Act in place—and the
greater awareness of the delicate balance between national security and
348
civil liberties that would come with the law’s control mechanisms —it is
possible that police might have decided to devise an entirely different
type of counterterrorism intelligence program. But the more important
point is that, with these control mechanisms in place, the public would
be better poised to respond with flexible, dynamic laws and regulations
to preserve privacy while still addressing national security. As can be
seen, this approach has a number of advantages over more static
constitutional remedies like those in the Fourth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In our current political climate, the nation’s collective thumb is
349
indeed pressing on the scale in the direction of national security. The
population demands protection from further terrorist attacks and insists
that the devastation of September 11, 2001, not be allowed to repeat
itself. The government has responded, making funding available to
police forces across the country and encouraging them to serve as the
front line in the war on terror, even if at the expense of civil liberties.
But, though we may have asked for such measures, we are not
subsequently prevented from unasking them in the interest of protecting
our civil liberties. This Comment has discussed two significant ways this
346. See supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text.
347. Police appear to have attempted this, somewhat belatedly, in Los Angeles. See
supra note 69. In New York, however, the surveillance program appears to have been kept
much more secret, with no attempt at community engagement. See Hawley, supra note 89.
348. See supra Part V.C for an outline of the proposed control mechanisms, such as
third-party oversight, regular reporting of surveillance activities, and in-depth training for
officers involved in intelligence-gathering operations.
349. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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might occur. One—the Fourth Amendment—may not offer much hope
for individuals, while the other—statutory limits—appears more
promising. The so-called Maryland model discussed in Part V is only
one example of such a statute, but the specific form and substance of
such a statute, and even whether a statute is the best corrective method,
will be left to the decision makers of the future. It is imperative,
however, that a decision be made. Surveillance and intelligencegathering methods and technologies will only become more covert,
more invasive, and more economically feasible. Taking the easy way
out—punting these decisions another thirty years into the future—is to
risk allowing the issue to bypass us altogether, such that the use of these
tactics may become so pervasive that we will truly miss our chance to
opt out.
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